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1257 
GLOBALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION OF FEDERAL 
CORPORATE PROSECUTIONS: 
THE PRESSURES ERODING FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
 
Katarina Resar Krasulova* 
ABSTRACT 
Over the past several decades, our society has continued to 
become even more globalized and interconnected. The dynamic put 
increasing pressure on the fairness of criminal trials in domestic 
courts. This Article discusses two recent phenomena that illustrate 
this evolution and their impact on the defendants’ rights against self-
incrimination: the globalization and privatization of the federal 
prosecutions. Globalization is understood as the United States’ 
Government’s increased reliance on foreign authorities in prosecution 
of cross-border crimes, while privatization denotes the Government’s 
reliance on private actors in conducting investigations. Investigations 
conducted by private entities and foreign governments, and the 
evidence those investigations produce, raise significant constitutional 
questions. Accordingly, this Article positions these phenomena and 
recent case law side-by-side the Fifth Amendment precedent that 
interpreted the constitutional protections against self-incrimination 
expansively. To best preserve the values of the Fifth Amendment, 
federal courts should evaluate compelled testimony with a flexible 
evidentiary standard. This standard must be cognizant of the 
changing prosecutorial landscape creating new contexts where 
defendants may incriminate themselves, and of how can such 
confessions shape the direction of investigations. 
 
 
* The author is a J.D. candidate at Harvard Law School.  She also holds a B.A. from 
Yale University and M.A. from the Graduate Institute in Geneva.  I am thankful to 
the editors of the Touro Law Review for their careful and considerate editing. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The recent cases United States v. Allen1 and United States v. 
Connolly,2 both instances of federal prosecution of foreign citizens in 
the U.S. courts in connection with the global LIBOR scandal, 
demonstrated increasing pressures that the constantly evolving 
methods of federal prosecution places on the Fifth Amendment 
protections and evidentiary rules.  The pressures include, but are not 
limited to, cooperation with foreign governments and enforcement 
agencies and outsourcing of the government’s investigative functions 
to private actors.  In Allen, the Second Circuit rejected the 
government’s use of compelled testimonies of two British citizens 
obtained by the British enforcement authorities pursuant to their 
lawful power in the U.S. courts.3  In Connolly, the Southern District 
Court for the District of New York found that the government 
“outsourced” its investigative powers to Deutsche Bank’s private 
counsel.4  The court found that the government substantially directed 
the investigation, including the requests to interview Connolly’s co-
defendant Black in the Deutsche Bank’s London office.5  Because 
these interviews were fairly attributable to the government, they were 
therefore compelled for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment.6 
This Article argues that the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination is broad and inclusive of protections 
against the growing and changing landscape of federal prosecutions.  
Statistical data and recent caselaw demonstrate the growth of 
situations where the federal government cooperates with foreign 
governments or private actors, and gains access to potentially 
compelled testimony that had not been afforded constitutional 
protections against self-incrimination.7 
These processes are driven by what this Article refers to as 
the globalization and privatization of federal prosecutions.  To 
understand the changing prosecutorial landscape and content of these 
terms, the Article in Part II discusses the historical origins of the 
 
1 864 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2017). 
2 No. 16 Cr. 0370, 2019 WL 2120523 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2019). 
3 See infra notes 293-294 and accompanying text.  
4 See infra note 335 and accompanying text. 
5 See infra notes 327-330 and accompanying text. 
6 See infra note 335. 
7 See infra Part III. 
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privilege against self-incrimination.  The Article then addresses the 
legal uncertainties about the scope of the permissible use of 
compelled testimonies.  The contours of permissible uses of 
compelled testimony and the surrounding uncertainties become 
important and as new actors—such as foreign governments or private 
entities acting on behalf of the government described in this Article—
became sources of evidence for and agents under the direction of the 
government. 
The Article further points out that the self-incrimination 
privilege is insufficiently protected by judicial inquiry that 
categorically excludes certain types of compelled uses.  A rigid 
judicial standard cannot capture the complexity and constant change 
that surround corporate prosecutions.  Rather, this Article argues the 
inquiry of whether a particular use of a compelled testimony is 
permissible should be qualitative in nature, analyzing the instances of 
compelled testimony individually and with due effect given to the 
surrounding circumstances.  This approach is more faithful to the 
historical and precedential understanding of the Fifth Amendment.  
Such an approach also allows the court to maintain the requisite 
flexibility to assess novel situations arising from ever-evolving 
globalized and privatized federal prosecutions. 
In Part III, the Article explains how globalization increased 
U.S. prosecutions of complex cross-border corporate crime, and, in 
the process, strengthened the federal government’s cooperation with 
foreign governments and corporations.  When prosecuting complex 
financial crimes that span continents, federal prosecutors increasingly 
rely on cooperation with foreign governments and private businesses 
(including and especially the very businesses under investigation) in 
the process of gathering evidence.  These trends have led to some 
remarkable changes in federal corporate investigations, including, for 
example, embedding federal prosecutors with foreign organizations, 
and the federal government directing private counsel to conduct 
internal investigations on behalf of the government.  
Although cooperation with governments and corporations can 
bring benefits to society in terms of better and more efficient 
informational access and prosecution of guilty actors, it places 
increasing pressure on the Fifth Amendment rights of mid-level 
corporate employees who are often far removed from the corporate 
wrongdoing, but often the most likely to get implicated in an 
investigation.  The recent caselaw introduced in Part IV shows that 
3
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the federal courts recognized that the trends in globalization and 
privatization of federal prosecutions have put pressure on the Fifth 
Amendment protections.  Neither foreign governments nor private 
institutions are bound by the constraints of the U.S. Constitution on 
gathering evidence, including the Fifth Amendment’s protection 
against self-incrimination.  In this new regime, foreign governments 
turn over to the federal government testimony compelled abroad.  
Corporations, on the other hand, provide internal documents and 
interviews with employees that the government can use as a roadmap 
for the investigation. 
The Fifth Amendment commands that a defendant compelled 
to testify must be granted an immunity that would put him in a 
position as if he chose to invoke his right against self-incrimination 
and not testify.8  Yet both situations are examples of where a 
compelled testimony influences the direction of the federal 
prosecution, without the requisite Fifth Amendment privilege. 
Accordingly, this Article offers a novel outlook on 
globalization and privatization of the federal prosecutions, viewing 
them as overlapping and mutually reinforcing phenomena that arose 
in response to the growth of complex multi-national financial crime 
and that are constantly evolving, demanding a continuous and close 
scrutiny to their effects on the employees’ rights. 
 
II. UNCERTAIN OUTER BOUNDS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
PRIVILEGE  
Despite the importance of the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition 
against self-incrimination in the American history and jurisprudence, 
the judicial precedent in the past century has brought uncertainty and 
confusion about the exact scope of the privilege.  The history and 
early Fifth Amendment jurisprudence reveal the central place of the 
privilege in the American Constitution.9  The privilege embodies the 
quintessential American values that protect an individual from an 
accumulation of power in the hands of the government. 
However, towards the end of the twentieth century, the 
Supreme Court precedent on the scope of the privilege against self-
incrimination created at least three relevant categories of unresolved 
 
8 See generally Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). 
9 See generally id. at 444-45. 
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tensions concerning: (1) the reach of the protection; (2) the scope of 
permissible uses for compelled testimony in a grant of immunity; and 
(3) the contours of actions attributable to the government.10  These 
jurisprudential lacunae are particularly fraught in an age of parallel 
international investigations and investigations that are closely 
coordinated with banks’ private counsels.  The courts developed 
categorical tests in the attempt of trying to outline the contours of 
permissible uses of compelled testimony uses under the Fifth 
Amendment, which however only added to the complexity of the 
inquiry. 
The complexity and rigidity of the courts’ Fifth Amendment 
inquiry, which focuses on categorizing uses of compelled testimony 
into evidentiary and non-evidentiary, make it unfit for the fast 
developing, continents-spanning, and multi-actor federal prosecutions 
that developed in the past thirty years.11  Every year, there are more 
opportunities and novel avenues for a governmental exposure to 
compelled testimonies.12  Neither a categorical inquiry that rules out 
a class of compelled uses nor the government’s taint teams can 
sufficiently protect the Fifth Amendment privilege. To counteract the 
change, the courts need to be attentive to these changes in federal 
prosecutions that reach the American courtrooms and subject the 
instances of foreign and private cooperation to a heightened scrutiny.  
In this effort, the accompanying inquiry under the Fifth Amendment 
must focus on the effects of a governmental compelled testimony use, 
while considering the surrounding circumstances such as the 
powerful institutional and governmental actors informing the 
prosecution, and their relationship to the individual. 
A. The History of the Fifth Amendment  
The Fifth Amendment commands that “no person . . . shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”13  
The origins of the privilege are often dated by the scholars to the 
 
10 See infra Parts II, IV. 
11 See infra Parts II.C., II.D. 
12 See infra Part III (for a description of prosecutorial trends in the increasingly 
interconnected and globalized world). 
13 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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second half of the seventeenth century.14  In those times, the English 
Court of Star Chamber and the ecclesiastical courts were known for 
extracting coerced confessions using a host of nowadays-illegal 
means, including torture.15  The truth and falsity of the allegation 
were not as important to the English authorities as extracting a 
confession from the defendant—a process that attested to the 
oppressive and unbridled power of the sovereign against which the 
defendant had no protection.16  
A defendant in the English courts of that era not only did not 
have rights against coercive self-incrimination, but often did not even 
know the charges he faced.17  The need for a right against a coercive 
power of the state was ever so strong in a system where power of the 
state went unchecked.  The individual was often powerless in the 
hands of the state.  Such was the experience of “Freeborn John 
Lilburne” whom the scholars often credit with being the first to 
publicly advocate, on his own behalf, for his right against self-
incrimination.18  Lilburne was arrested under charges of importing 
“factious and scandalous books” into England and brought in front of 
the Privy Council of the Star Chamber in 1637.19  He refused to take 
the ex officio oath that required him to answer questions asserting the 
recognized right of a freeborn Englishman not to accuse himself.20 
 
14 See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047 (1994); Richard McMahon, 
Kastigar v. United States: The Immunity Standard Redefined, 18 CATH. LAW. 314 
(1972). 
15 See Richard McMahon, Kastigar v. United States: The Immunity Standard 
Redefined, 18 CATH. LAW. 314, 317 (1972). 
16 Langbein, supra note 14, at 1048.  The beyond reasonable doubt standard of 
proof necessary for a criminal conviction today was not articulated in English law 
until the last decade of the eighteenth century.  Id.  The government’s and courts’ 
assumption was not that the defendant is innocent until proven guilty, but perhaps 
something along the lines if innocent, then it will somehow show.  Id. at 1057.  
Furthermore, the accused’s defense was complicated by the fact that he or she had 
to spend almost all the time pending trial in jail.  Id. at 1057-58. 
17 Id. at 1058.  The English law forbade the defendant from obtaining a copy of the 
indictment pre-trial and at the trial.  In fact, the court clerk merely summarized the 
indictment to the defendant at the trial.  Id. 
18 Joseph L. Rauh Jr., The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination from John Lilburne 
to Ollie North, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 405, 405-06 (1988). 
19 Id. at 405. 
20 Id. 
6
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The English authorities did not take well to Lilburn’s 
arguments and sentenced him to a punishment.21  Lilburne continued 
to protest and publicly campaign against his sentence.  He produced 
numerous tracts and pamphlets on the topic and eventually 
successfully asserted his right against coerced self-incrimination in 
1649 before an Extraordinary Commission of Oyer and Terminer 
composed of many distinguished legal authorities of the day.22  At 
last, Lilburne’s life-long effort fighting against his sentence and 
defending the right of a freeborn man not to accuse himself bore its 
fruits.  The English Parliament not only indemnified Lilburne in 
1649, but also recognized the right against self-incrimination as a 
defense to the ex officio oath, but as an accepted principle in common 
law criminal procedure.23  The privilege against self-incrimination 
since then became part of the English Common Law.24   
But what does a privilege unused, or privilege designed to be 
used ineffectively amount to in a criminal trial?  Not too much, 
according to early historical sources on the newly recognized right 
against self-incrimination.  A seminal study of pamphlet reports of 
London trials from the 1670s—about 20 years after the recognition of 
the privilege against self-incrimination—to the mid-1730s did not 
show a “single case in which an accused refused to speak on asserted 
grounds of privilege, or in which he makes the least allusion to a 
 
21 Id. 
22 See Neill H. Alford, Jr., The Right of Silence, 79 YALE L.J. 1618, 1621 (1970) 
(reviewing LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT 
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION (1968)). 
23 Id. at 1621. 
24 Id. (“Lilburne had made the difference. From this time on, the right against self-
incrimination was an established, respected rule of the common law, or more 
broadly, English law generally.”).  See also McMahon, supra note 14, at 317 n.17.  
The ideological foundation of the right against self-incrimination can be dated to 
earlier religious traditions.  For example, Judaic law recognized the principle before 
modern times.  Id.  See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: 
THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 433-34 (1968).  A maxim that “a man 
cannot represent himself as guilty, or as a transgressor” was an essential part of 
procedure in the Rabbinic courts in the ancient times.  Id.  See Akhil Reed Amar & 
Renée B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 
93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 896 (1995).  The medieval law of the Roman church equally 
adhered to the maxim nemo tenetur prodere seipsum or “no one is obliged to 
accuse himself.”  Id.  This maxim was taken to mean that a duty to reveal sins at 
confession did not require having to come forward and accuse oneself in court.  Id. 
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privilege against self-incrimination.”25  The explanation for the 
curious under-use of the newly recognized right is not obvious from 
what happened at trial, but rather from what happened before the 
trial.  By the time the accused reached the courtroom, he would have, 
wittingly or unwittingly, implicated himself enough times to render 
the privilege worthless.26  The criminal system that came into being 
by the end of the eighteenth century in England was marked by a 
“self-evidently schizophrenic criminal procedure.”27  In this system, 
legal and legislative authorities created a trial right that they 
destroyed in the pre-trial.28  The lessons from the eighteenth century 
English attempt to embrace the right against self-incrimination 
remain pertinent even today. They speak of the importance of 
safeguarding the right at all stages of criminal procedures.  
Insufficient protection of the privilege in an early stage of 
investigation can lead to an incrimination of the accused that 
permeates the entire investigation and could therefore render any 
subsequent protective safeguards futile. 
An additional factor inhibiting effective use of the self-
incrimination privilege by defendants was the dearth of involvement 
of counsel and the structure of the criminal proceedings.  An attorney 
could advise defendants how to be strategically invoke the privilege 
against self-incrimination.  Thus, the defendant bore the double 
burden of having to testify and being his or her own defense counsel, 
which made use of the right against self-incrimination difficult, if not 
 
25 Langbein, supra note 14, at 1066.  Other sources also confirm that there was still 
a presumption placed on the accused to say why he was not guilty.  See id. at 1049 
n.7, 1066 n.83 (citing J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND: 1660-
1800 (1986)).  If the accused did not speak in his defense, the courts often held 
invocation of silence as admission of guilt.  Id. at 1047. 
26 Id. at 1061.  During this time, inquisitorial tactics were routine in pre-trial stages.  
Id.  For example, the Marian pretrial procedure, named after The Marian Committal 
Statute of 1555, routinely included practices such as transcribing anything that the 
defendant said after apprehension as “material to prove the felony” and required an 
officer collecting evidence to testify against the accused.  Id. at 1059-61. 
27 Id. at 1062. 
28 Id. at 1059-62. 
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impossible.29  But the defense counsels over time became more 
involved with the court, gradually taking over the defense role 
previously carried by the defendant “speaking.”30  Importantly, the 
defense counsel also began to strategically silence the defendants and 
suppress their testimonial role in all stages of the criminal 
proceedings.31 
The English legal tradition carried over across the ocean to 
the newly established colonies.  By the end of the eighteenth century, 
the American colonies began adopting the privilege against self-
incrimination.32  The governors of the first American colonies 
brought to the New Continent European interrogation techniques and 
coercive practices—including torture.33  The colonies looked into the 
English law for guidance, and adopted common law privileges 
against coercive self-incrimination as means of checking these 
governmental abusive practices.34  Each of the original thirteen states 
recognized the privilege through common law or express 
constitutional provision, and the self-incrimination was also adopted 
as the fifth constitutional amendment in 1791.35  Nowadays, all but 
two American states explicitly recognize the privilege in their state 
 
29 Id. at 1069-71.  Several important transformations of the criminal law and related 
judicial proceedings occurred in the eighteenth century: (1) The concept of 
production burden, and that the prosecution bore it, slowly started to take hold; (2) 
at the same time, the presumption of innocence was formulated, which encouraged 
the defense counsel to silence the accused in order to have the prosecution build the 
case; (3) the law of criminal evidence formed, introducing objections against 
certain types of evidence and questions; (4) the judge decreased in importance as 
counsel for prosecution while defense took over witness examination; and (5) these 
developments cumulatively facilitated and further required greater use of defense 
counsels at trials.  Id. 
30 Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1086, 1092 (1994).  The so-
called “accused speaks” trial was prevalent in England in the fifteenth century.  Id. 
at 1089.  The model aimed at securing a defendant’s confession and prohibited 
representation by counsel.  The “accused speaks” trial model was also prevalent in 
the American colonies from the settlement until the end of the eighteenth century.  
Id. at 1091-92. 
31 Langbein, supra note 14, at 1071. 
32 Jefferson Keenan, Nonevidentiary Use of Compelled Testimony and the 
Increased Likelihood of Conviction, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 173, 175 (1990). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id.  
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constitutions.36  With this constitutionally recognized right it also 
became clear that the government retained the power to compel a 
testimony, but only upon a grant of an immunity that would wholly 
preserve the privilege against incrimination.37 
The privilege against self-incrimination, as pointed out by the 
Supreme Court, reflects many fundamental American values and 
aspirations.38  The Supreme Court held that the privilege stands for 
the “unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel 
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt,” as well as “fear 
that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane 
treatment and abuses.”39  According to the Supreme Court, the sense 
for fair play dictating “a fair state-individual balance by requiring the 
government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown 
for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with 
the individual to shoulder the entire load.”40 
The values that buttress the policies are the “respect for the 
inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each 
individual to a private enclave where he may lead a private life,” and 
that “the privilege, while sometimes a shelter to the guilty, is often a 
protection to the innocent.”41  These values, albeit admittedly 
undefined,42 became a part of the constitutional fabric despite the 
surrounding lack of clarity about how to best protect them, and 
contributed to proliferation of the Court’s opinions and scholarly 
 
36 McMahon, supra note 14, at 317.  The two states that do not recognize the 
privilege against self-incrimination in their constitutions are Idaho and New Jersey, 
but both have statutes that recognize the right to the same effect.  Id. at n.17 (citing 
ERWIN GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY (1955)).  
37 See Keenan, supra note 18, at 176 (Congress enacted the first federal immunity 
statute in 1857, which provided the witness could not be prosecuted for any acts 
connected to his compelled testimony in exchange for providing the government 
with previously inaccessible testimony.). 
38 See generally Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972). 
39 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). 
40 Id. (quoting 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 317 
(McNaughton ed., 5th ed. 1961)). 
41 Id (quotations omitted). 
42 See Ronald J. Allen, M. Kristin Mace, The Self-Incrimination Clause Explained 
and Its Future Predicted, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 244 (2004) (stating 
that the values are “striking in their vacuity and circularity.”).  Justice Murphy, 
remarked on the topic that “the law and the lawyers . . . have never made up their 
minds just what [the Fifth Amendment] is supposed to do or just whom it is 
intended to protect.”  Id. at 245. 
10
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opinions without a resolution.43  It is against these strong aspirations, 
but definitional uncertainty that the global and national events 
impacting the Fifth Amendment unfold.  
B. Twenty-First Century Challenges to The 
Application of The Fifth Amendment 
Maintaining the protections and furthering the values of the 
Fifth Amendment became increasingly challenging as national, 
international, and government-private interactions became more 
frequent and complex.  The familiar situation in which a federal 
prosecutor interrogates a defendant who asserts her Fifth Amendment 
privilege became replaced by a foreign sovereign compelling a 
testimony sought to be used in a U.S. prosecution.44  Alternatively, 
the prosecution may not even be carried out by a prosecutor.45  
Instead, a private institutional counsel appointed to carry out an 
internal investigation can subject an employee to an interview under a 
threat of job termination.46  A government, often directing the private 
counsel in the course of a corporate internal investigation and 
conditioning the firm’s and counsel’s cooperation on favorable 
settlement terms, can subsequently use this compelled testimony in 
the domestic prosecutions.47  
In the first instance, the U.S. enforcement authorities face a 
situation where a defendant was compelled by a foreign nation that 
conducts a parallel investigation.  According to the Second Circuit in 
United States v. Allen,48 the Fifth Amendment protections against 
self-incrimination extend to situations where a U.S. prosecuting 
authority uses a testimony compelled by a foreign sovereign.49  The 
 
43 See id.  For example, Amar and Lettow remark that “[t]he Self-Incrimination 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment is an unsolved riddle of vast proportions, a Gordian 
knot in the middle of our Bill of Rights,” while William Stuntz concludes that “[i]t 
is probably fair to say that most people familiar with the doctrine surrounding the 
privilege against self-incrimination believe that it cannot be squared with any 
rational theory.”  Amar & Lettow, supra note 24, at 857. 
44 See infra Part IV.A (discussing United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 
2017)). 
45 See Part IV.B (discussing United States v. Connolly, No. 16 CR. 0370, 2019 WL 
2120523 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2019)). 
46 See id. 
47 See infra notes 198-200 and accompanying text. 
48 864 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2017). 
49 Id. at 101. 
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second instance applies to situations where the government engages 
and directs a private institution’s investigations so that the actions of 
the institution become de facto the government’s action.  This 
occurred in United States v. Connolly,50 where the court found that 
the government’s lack of independent investigative action and 
substantial directing of the Deutsche Bank’s private investigation 
through its counsel were attributable to the government.51  
Both Allen and Connolly address novel situations surrounding 
application of the Fifth Amendment privilege.  But even prior to 
Allen and Connolly, the courts have struggled with defining the exact 
scope of the privilege.  In the past century, the United States’ courts 
transitioned from an absolute requirement of immunity that forbade 
any subsequent prosecution to a limited immunity requirement.52  
The Supreme Court gradually restricted the absolute immunity 
established by Counselman v. Hitchcock53 to apply only in the 
context of the interactions between the state and federal 
government.54  In the second half of the twentieth century, the 
Supreme Court then abrogated Counselman’s absolute immunity in 
compelled testimony situations in United States v. Kastigar.55  The 
Court in Kastigar allowed subsequent prosecution of a compelled 
witness provided that the prosecution did not rely on the witness’s 
compelled testimony or on evidence directly or indirectly derived 
from such testimony.56 
However, the Court in Kastigar did not clarify exactly what is 
the direct or indirect evidence that is prohibited or what evidence is 
admissible under the new immunity standard.57  Lower courts and 
scholars differed in their views on the types of testimonial uses 
afforded protections under the Fifth Amendment as interpreted by 
Kastigar, resulting in uncertainties for defendants.58  The 
uncertainties about the scope of the Fifth Amendment protections, 
including questions about the scope of the immunity in new contexts 
or permissibility of certain evidentiary uses, surrounded the recent 
 
50 No. 16 Cr. 0370, 2019 WL 2120523 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2019). 
51 Id. at *10.  
52 See supra notes 50-52; see also infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text. 
53 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892). 
54 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 77-78 (1964). 
55 406 U.S. 441 (1972).  
56 Id. at 448-49. 
57 See infra notes 118-26. 
58 See infra Part II.D. 
12
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Allen and Connolly decisions.59  To understand the decisions, one 
must consider both the current changing trends in global and national 
prosecutions involving the self-incrimination privilege and the 
historical context, and subsequent caselaw, in which the privilege 
developed. 
The analysis of the current and historical trends coalesces 
around the central purpose of the of the Fifth Amendment privilege 
that seeks to prevent the government from using its power to place a 
witness into the “cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or 
contempt.”60  The Anglo-American legal tradition shows that the 
protections granted by the Fifth Amendment are essential to prevent 
governmental abuses and to honor a person’s dignitary rights to lead 
a private life without unfettered interference by the government. 
C. Government Immunity Grants and the Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination Explained 
The developments in the scope of the Fifth Amendment 
immunity were accompanied by a host of complex and confusing 
jargon.  It is important to decipher the meaning of the shorthand to 
both understand the relevant court decisions and consider the 
overlapping, and often uncertain meaning of this terminology. 
The most well-known immunity types recognized in criminal 
trials and statutes of the past century are (1) absolute immunity, also 
known as transactional immunity, and (2) use-plus-fruits immunity,61 
also referred to as use and derivative immunity.62  The distinction 
between absolute and use-plus-fruits immunities can be illustrated by 
 
59 See infra Part IV. 
60 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). 
61 Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968) (describing the use-plus-fruits 
doctrine in).  In Harrison, the Court found that the Petitioners coerced testimony at 
an earlier trial was inadmissible in later proceedings because it was the “fruit of the 
illegally procured confessions.”  Id. at 221.  To arrive at the conclusion, the Court 
perused language from the Fourth Amendment case, Wong Sun v. United States, to 
show that the Petitioner’s testimony had not been “obtained ‘by means sufficiently 
distinguishable’ from the underlying illegality ‘to be purged of the primary taint.’”  
Id. at 226 (quoting 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)).  See Anonymous, Standards for 
Exclusion in Immunity Cases after Kastigar and Zicarelli, 82 YALE L.J. 171, 174 
n.19 (1972). 
62 See generally Hanah Metchis Volokah, Congressional Immunity Grants and 
Separation of Powers: Legislative Vetoes of Federal Prosecutions, 95 GEO. L.J. 
2017, 2021-24 (2007) (discussing transactional, use, and derivative use immunity). 
13
Resar Krasulova: Globalization and Privatization
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center,
1270 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 37 
an example.  Let’s consider the following statement: “After the 
murder, I hid the gun under a tree in the park.”63  The broadest 
immunity standard — transactional or absolute immunity — would 
afford a witness immunity for any prosecution arising from the event.  
The prosecution cannot prosecute using the testimony or the gun they 
subsequently found.  But the prosecution also cannot prosecute the 
witness based on accomplice testimony who the prosecution 
encountered en route to the crime scene.  Any prosecution related to 
the occurrence is barred under transactional immunity. 
On the other hand, under a use-plus-fruits conception of 
immunity in the murder and hidden gun situation, a prosecutor again 
cannot use against the witness the compelled testimony or the gun to 
which the testimony pointed.  But if a prosecutor finds the gun in an 
unrelated way — say, for example, based on an information from a 
testimony of an accomplice or by stumbling upon it by walking her 
dog in the park—the gun becomes admissible evidence in a criminal 
case against the witness.64 
The past hundred years was marked by developments in U.S. 
courts that changed the breadth of the protections under the self-
incrimination clause.  The courts shifted from viewing immunity 
grants as absolute or transactional, guaranteeing an individual 
freedom from subsequent prosecution.  The majority of the courts 
view the Fifth Amendment as demanding only an undefined version 
of a restricted immunity.  The more restrictive view, unlike at the 
beginning of the twenty first century, allows in certain circumstances 
for a subsequent prosecution of a compelled witness.65 
The Supreme Court’s landmark case that first defined the 
scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege was Counselman v. 
Hitchcock.66  Counselman was a dealer in grain questioned in front of 
a grand jury about whether he obtained certain grain rebates in 
violation of Interstate Commerce Commission regulations.67  
Counselman refused to answer these questions on the ground that the 
answers would incriminate him.68  The questioning authority, the 
 
63 See id. at 2021. 
64 See id. at 2021-23. 
65 See infra text accompanying note 76. 
66 142 U.S. 547 (1892). 
67 Id. at 549-50.  The federal regulation made it a criminal offense for a railroad’s 
officer or agent to grant shippers and dealers a lesser rate than the tariff or open 
rate.  Id. 
68 Id. 
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Interstate Commerce Commission, offered Counselman a statutory 
immunity in exchange for his testimony.69  This immunity, however, 
would not foreclose Counselman’s future prosecution based on 
evidence indirectly obtained on the basis of the testimony.70  The 
immunity grant would only disallow prosecutors from directly using 
Counselman’s testimony—also known as use immunity.71 
Given the limited protections offered by the statutory 
immunity, Counselman again refused to answer the court’s 
questions.72  Counselman’s refusal led the court to adjudge him to be 
in contempt of the court and sentenced him to imprisonment and a 
fine.73 
The Supreme Court on review considered whether the 
statutory immunity sufficed to safeguard Counselman’s constitutional 
privilege against self-incrimination.74  The Court critically observed 
that the immunity offered to Counselman “would not prevent the use 
of [Counselman’s] testimony to search out other testimony to be used 
in evidence against him or his property.” 75  Such immunity therefore 
could not prevent “the obtaining and the use of witnesses and 
evidence which should be attributable directly to the testimony he 
might give under compulsion.”76  The Court found that the 
government’s derivative use of Counselman’s testimony may lead to 
a conviction where otherwise, if Counselman simply refused to 
answer, he could not be convicted.77  Thus, the Court held that the 
 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 585-86. 
71 Id. at 560. 
No pleading of a party, nor any discovery or evidence obtained 
from a party or witness by means of a judicial proceeding in this 
or any foreign country, shall be given in evidence, or in any 
manner used against him or his property or estate, in any court of 
the United States, in any criminal proceeding, or for the 
enforcement of any penalty or forfeiture: provided, that this 
section shall not exempt any party or witness from prosecution 
and punishment for perjury committed in discovering or 
testifying as aforesaid. 
 Id. at 560-61. 
72 Id. at 552-53. 
73 Id.  
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statutory immunity allowing such use was not “co-extensive with the 
constitutional provision”78 because it “does not supply a complete 
protection from all the perils against which the constitutional 
prohibition was designed to guard . . . .”79 
However, the Court in Counselman did not hold that the use-
plus-fruits immunity statute would suffice to protect the defendant’s 
privilege against self-incrimination.80  Instead, the Court held that for 
an immunity statute to survive a constitutional review, it must “afford 
absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offense to which 
the question relates.”81 
Not too long after Counselman and in direct response to the 
Court’s holding, Congress enacted a statute that codified absolute, 
also known as transactional, immunity from prosecution in a 
compelled testimony situation.82  The newly codified immunity was 
soon challenged and upheld by the Supreme Court in Brown v. 
Walker.83  After Walker, absolute immunity came to be the standard 
for numerous federal immunity statutes,84 and became an essential 
 
78 Id. at 565. 
79 Id. at 586. 
80 See id. at 585-86. 
81 Id. (emphasis added).  
82 Compulsory Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443-44 (1893) provided: 
That no person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from 
producing books, papers, tariffs, contracts, agreements and documents . . . 
on the ground or for the reason that the testimony or evidence, 
documentary or otherwise, required of him, may tend to criminate him or 
subject him to a penalty or forfeiture. But no person shall be prosecuted or 
subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, 
matter or thing, concerning which he may testify, or produce 
evidence . . . . 
Id. 
83 161 U.S. 591 (1986).  The Court split five-four with Justices Field, Shiras, Gray, 
and White dissenting.  Id. at 610-38.  Justice Field in a separate dissenting opinion 
wrote that “[t]he amendment also protects him [Walker] from all compulsory 
testimony which would expose him to infamy and disgrace, though the facts 
disclosed might not lead to a criminal prosecution.” Id. at 631 (Field, J., 
dissenting).  The Court refused to endorse the broader interpretation of the 
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination that would protect from infamy, 
disgrace and the expense of employing a counsel and providing a defense.  Id. at 
597. 
84 See J.A.C. Grant, Federalism and Self-Incrimination, 4 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 549, 
552-53 (1957).  The language from the immunity statute enacted in response to 
Counselman v. Hitchcock became the standard for numerous federal statutes. Id. 
(discussing 142 U.S. 547 (1892)). 
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part of the Unites States’ “constitutional fabric.”85  The 
Counselman’s immunity standard was not systematically revisited by 
the Court until the early 1970s.86 
But new questions about Counselman’s implications arose in 
1964 when the Supreme Court considered the scope of immunity 
grants in a multi-jurisdictional context.  There, the Court considered 
whether the Amendment applies to the states.  Finding that it does, 
the Court next decided how much immunity is required in parallel 
state and federal prosecutions. 
The case in question was Malloy v. Hogan,87 where the 
Supreme Court held that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment is binding on the states through the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 88  Malloy was arrested and jailed for 
gambling in Connecticut but he later pled guilty and was released on 
probation.89  About sixteen months into his guilty plea, a Connecticut 
court ordered Malloy to testify about these gambling and other 
criminal activities, but Malloy refused to answer on the ground that 
the answers would violate his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination. 90  However, a Connecticut state court held that the 
Amendment’s privileges do not extend to Malloy in a state 
proceeding.91  The Supreme Court reversed the Connecticut’s 
Supreme Court of Errors’ ruling, holding that the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination is available to a witness in a state 
 
85 Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956). 
86 Id. at 424.  Arguably, the transactional immunity doctrine withstood the greatest 
challenge in a McCarthy era espionage investigation.  In Ullman, the Petitioner, 
Ullman, refused to answer questions before a grand jury about his membership in 
the Communist party.  Id.  Ullman claimed that such admission would lead to a 
potential risk of his job, passport, and union membership.  Id. at 430.  Yet the 
Supreme Court upheld the transactional immunity standard despite the potential 
grave consequence for Ullman.  Id. at 439. 
87 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
88 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964).  See Harry T. Quick, Constitutional 
Law—Self-Incrimination—A New State Standard, 15 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 797, 
797 (1964).  The mechanism of expanding the constitutional rights protections 
through the Fourteenth Amendment was characteristic of the era when Malloy was 
decided.  The decision followed reasoning outlined in a series of civil rights cases 
that include Gitlow v. New York, Mapp v. Ohio, and Gideon v. Wainwright.  Id. 
(citing 268 U.S. 652 (1925); 367 U.S. 643 (1961); 372 U.S. 335 (1963)). 
89 Malloy, 378 U.S. at 1. 
90 Id. at 3. 
91 Id. 
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court.92  In this holding, the Supreme Court stressed the essential 
values of the American legal system that is “accusatorial,” not 
“inquisitorial,” which compels the government to establish guilt by 
evidence independently obtained—be it compulsion to self-
incrimination or compulsion by torture.93 
But the decision in Malloy also opened previously unexplored 
questions about how immunity grants interact on the state and the 
federal prosecution levels.94  On one hand, federal prosecutors could 
not ignore the state grants of transactional immunity, because that 
would render the attempted protection by state immunity grants 
futile.  On the other hand, the authorities could not be prevented from 
prosecuting a party who was previously granted a state transactional 
immunity,95 because such disablement would be arguably in violation 
of the Supremacy Clause.96 
The Supreme Court addressed the problem of the overlapping 
federal and state sovereign authority grant on the very same day as 
Malloy.97  Justice Goldberg, writing for the majority in Murphy v. 
Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor,98 held that an 
immunity grant in one jurisdiction is binding on another.  But the 
Court introduced a twist to the application of multi-jurisdictional 
immunity—the state and federal immunity grants differed in scope. 
The Court held that “a state witness may not be compelled to 
give testimony which may be incriminating under federal law unless 
 
92 Id.  
93 Id. at 7. 
94 See, e.g., Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).  Before Malloy, the 
Court consistently held that a federal statute is capable of granting immunity to 
state proceedings.  See also United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 150 (1931).  
But a state has no power to give immunity from federal prosecutions.  
95 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 92-93 (1964).  
Justice White summarized the Court’s holding in Murphy by stating that “the 
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is nullified ‘when a witness ‘can 
be whipsawed into incriminating himself under both state and federal law even 
though’ the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable to 
each.’” Id.  He also pointed to the undesirable consequences of requiring an 
absolute immunity.  For example, an absolute immunity grant would invalidate 
immunity statutes in fifty states because the state authorities would lack the power 
to confer such immunity from federal prosecution.  Id. at 93-94.  The rule would 
thereby cut deeply and significantly into traditional and important areas of state 
authority and responsibility in our federal system.  Id. 
96 See Anonymous, supra note 61, at 173. 
97 Id. 
98 378 U.S. 52 (1964). 
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the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any manner 
by federal officials in connection with a criminal prosecution against 
him.”99  The Court in Murphy also held that while the grant of 
immunity in the prosecuting jurisdiction is absolute, or transactional, 
the immunity in the parallel prosecuting jurisdiction is sufficiently 
use-plus-fruits.100  This compromise protected an individual from a 
coerced game of catch with the parallel prosecuting state and federal 
authorities, where she would incriminate herself under an immunity 
grant in a state proceeding, only to be prosecuted on the basis of the 
testimony in the federal proceeding, and it also allowed for the 
existence of parallel state and federal proceedings.101 
The Court in Murphy did not reject absolute immunity in the 
first instance, but it resolved that a non-compelling jurisdiction (in 
that case, a parallel federal prosecution) does not have to be held to 
the same high standard of immunity.102  The non-compelling 
jurisdiction still cannot rely on the compelled testimony (use), or the 
fruits derived thereof, but it can prosecute on independently obtained 
evidence. 
But the Court never answered what happens when the 
questioning and prosecuting jurisdictions are the same.  Thus, readers 
and commentators of Malloy asked whether the decision 
foreshadowed the later restriction of the immunity requirement in a 
single jurisdiction context from a transactional immunity to a use-
plus-fruits one, or whether it was merely a federalism compromise.  
Diverse and conflicting opinions surfaced about how to read 
Counselman, Malloy, and Murphy together.  Some commentators 
questioned whether the ruling in Murphy plainly diluted 
Counselman’s rule that required that both federal and state legislation 
only grant use-plus-fruits immunity.103  Others believed that there 
 
99 Id. at 79. 
100 Id. 
101 Justice White noted in Murphy that a grant of absolute immunity would lead to 
unwanted results in both state and federal prosecutions where either (1) widespread 
federal immunization would prevent States from having the power and means of 
obtaining information necessary for state law enforcement, and where (2) the 
Federal government would effectively become the only power with capacity to 
offer immunity in exchange for compelling testimony.  Id. at 93. 
102 See Alan D. Singer, State Grants of Immunity—The Problem of Interstate 
Prosecution Prevention, 58 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 218, 218 (1967). 
103 See Note, Counselman, Malloy, Murphy, and the States’ Power to Grant 
Immunity, 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 336, 339 (1966). 
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was a one-directional difference in the state and federal immunity 
grants—state witness under state immunity grant does not receive 
absolute immunity from federal prosecution, but a federal witness 
under a federal immunity statute does.104  The lower courts were no 
less perplexed about the type and the scope of constitutionally 
required immunity for compelled testimony.105 
Until 1970, transactional immunity was the standard for 
federal immunity statutes.106  But amidst the divergent interpretations 
of immunity coexistent with the Fifth Amendment in the aftermath of 
Malloy and Murphy, the Warren Court began to gravitate towards a 
requirement of use-plus-fruits standard instead of relying on the 
Counselman’s absolute immunity.107 
Congress seized this opportunity where courts began to waver 
on the immunity standard and passed an act that would aid law 
enforcement by easing the requirements for evidence gathering.108  
The new statute—Title II of the organized Crime Control Act of 
1970109—repealed the existing federal immunity statutes that 
mandated that a compelling authority grants a transactional 
 
104 Id. at 340. 
105 Compare In re Korman, 449 F.2d 32, 37 (7th Cir. 1971), rev’d, 406 U.S. 952 
(1972) (interpreting Murphy as not restricting Counselman and the scope of Fifth 
Amendment, but as “extend[ing] the fifth amendment’s requirement that a 
defendant’s involuntary statements never be used in any manner against him”), 
with Byers v. Justice Ct. for Ukiah Judicial Dist. of Mendocino Cty., 458 P.2d 465, 
472 (1969), vacated sub nom.  Gardner v Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276 (1968) 
(recognizing that “an individual raising a valid claim of privilege need not be given 
complete immunity from prosecution in order to be compelled to testify”).  See also 
Anonymous, supra note 61, at 171 n.19. 
106 See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972) (recognizing Piccirillo 
v. New York, 400 U.S. 548 at 571 n.11 (1971) and Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 
U.S. 71, 73 (1920) as minor exceptions to this rule).  Justice Brennan, in his 
dissenting opinion in Piccirillo, specified that Congress has written more than forty 
transactional immunity provisions into various federal statutes.  Piccirillo, 400 U.S. 
at 571.  Brennan also pointed out that the majority of the state immunity statutes 
provide for transaction immunity at that time, “even though the States were not 
subject to the full effect of the Fifth Amendment until 1964.”  Id. at 571-72. 
107 See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).  For example, in Marchetti, 
Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, found the use-plus-fruits restriction to 
a federal registration statute is “in principle an attractive and apparently practical 
resolution.”  Id. at 58.  See also Anonymous, supra note 61, at 174 n.19. 
108 See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 
Stat. 922, 222-23. 
109 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001–6005 (1970). 
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immunity,110 and replaced it with a statute that demanded use-plus-
fruits immunity.111   
Congress reasoned that the new statute codified the “use-
restriction immunity concept of Murphy v. Waterfront 
Commission”112 based on what “Congress judged to be the 
conceptual basis of Counselman . . . that immunity from the use of 
compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom is coextensive 
with the scope of the privilege.”113  But if the Constitution mandated 
that immunity be transactional, Congress could not lower the scope 
of the immunity grant to a use-plus-fruits protection barring a 
Constitutional amendment.  Thus, facing this new statute, the 
Supreme Court had to reevaluate its decision in Counselman and 
consider once again whether the new immunity sufficiently 
safeguarded the Fifth Amendment privilege. 
At the time when the Act was passed, Congress may have 
been reading between the lines of Murphy in claiming that use-plus-
fruits immunity is constitutionally permissible.  Only Justice White’s 
concurring opinion in Murphy lends the Congress’s view direct 
support.  White argued that the privilege against self-incrimination is 
secured when federal officials are barred from introducing the 
testimony, or evidence derived from such testimony, in the 
evidence.114  He wrote that “[t]he constitution does not require that 
 
110 See Anonymous, supra note 61, at 174. 
111 18 U.S.C. § 6002 in the relevant parts states that:  
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against 
self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a 
proceeding before or ancillary to—(1) a court or grand jury of the 
United States, (2) an agency of the United States, or (3) either 
House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a 
committee or a subcommittee of either House, and the person 
presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness an 
order issued under this title, the witness may not refuse to comply 
with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled 
under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived 
from such testimony or other information) may be used against 
the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, 
giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the 
order. 
18 U.S.C. § 6002 (emphasis added). 
112 H.R. REP. NO. 91-1188, 91ST CONG., 2d Sess. 4017-18 (1970). 
113 S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 51-56, 145 (1969); H.R. REP. NO. 91-1549, at 42 (1970). 
114 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 101 (1964). 
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immunity go so far as to protect against all prosecution to which the 
testimony relates, including prosecutions of another government . . . 
.”115  Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion in Kastigar disagreed 
with such interpretation of Murphy’s majority decision.  Douglas 
argued that Murphy was a decision about federalism and not the 
scope of the immunity coexistent with the Fifth Amendment.116  In 
Douglas’s view, Murphy squarely aimed to solve the question of 
interjurisdictional immunity and it said nothing about the scope of the 
immunity within the same jurisdiction.117 
But the Kastigar majority, the next important Supreme Court 
decision on the scope of the immunity, viewed Murphy and 
Counselman in a different light when addressing the Petitioners’ 
challenge to Congress’s new immunity statute.  Just as in Murphy, 
the Petitioners in Kastigar were summoned to testify in front of a 
federal Grand Jury.118  The Government granted the Petitioners a 
statutory immunity,119 but the Petitioners claimed the immunity grant 
was insufficient to replace their constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination—they demanded absolute immunity from 
prosecution.120  The Supreme Court rejected Petitioners’ demand, 
holding that the offered use-plus-fruits of immunity sufficiently 
protects their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.121  In so finding, the Court held that Murphy’s dual-
jurisdiction reasoning in adopting use-plus-fruits immunity applies to 
a single jurisdiction context, too.122  Yet, the Court in Kastigar did 
not expressly overrule Counselman.  Instead, the Court reasoned that 
Counselman’s requirement of transaction immunity was merely an 
example of a statute that would sufficiently protect an individual’s 
 
115 Id. at 106 (emphasis added).  
116 See Lawrence Rubenstein, Immunity and the Self-Incrimination Clause, 2 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 29, 32 
(1973) (“The Murphy decision was a product of the Court’s handling of a practical 
question of federalism; it did not broaden the duty to testify.”). 
117 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 464 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
118 Id. at 442. 
119 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001–6005 (1970). 
120 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 449. 
121 Id. at 462.  
122 Id. at 453. 
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Fifth Amendment rights,123 reducing Counselman’s transactional 
immunity requirement to a mere suggestion and a dictum.124 
The Kastigar Court specifically addressed the Petitioners’ 
concern that derivative-use immunity will be inadequate to protect a 
witness from a host of potential incriminating uses of testimony.125  
The Kastigar Petitioners argued that “[i]t will be difficult and perhaps 
impossible . . .  to identify, by testimony or cross-examination, the 
subtle ways in which the compelled testimony may disadvantage a 
witness . . . .”126  The Court dismissed this concern noting that the 
language of the immunity statute mandated a sweeping proscription 
against direct or indirect use of a testimony, which prevents using a 
compelled statement as an investigatory lead.127 
The differences between the lower courts post Kastigar 
concerning the scope of the prohibition against the derivative use of 
testimony suggests that the Court’s conclusion may have been 
premature.  The Court did not address the subtle, indirect, and often 
untraceable ways in which a compelled testimony may very well 
steer the direction of an investigation.128  Does it matter that the 
 
123 The Court in Kastigar recounted that the statute in question in Counselman only 
protected the defendant from direct use of the testimony, but not from evidence 
searched out on the basis of the testimony.  Id. at 450.  The Court reasoned that 
Counselman’s clear statement that “a statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford 
absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offence to which the question 
relates” means something else than can be understood from the plan meaning of the 
statute.  Id.  at 451 (quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892)).  
The Court in Kastigar reasoned that that the majority in Counselman stated that a 
statute “must afford absolute immunity;” they merely introduced one example of a 
statute that was sufficed to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege.  Id. at 454. 
124 Id. at 455. 
125 Id. at 459. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 459-60. 
128 This use is referred to as “non-evidentiary.”  But the difference between indirect 
evidentiary and non-evidentiary is difficult to capture in practice.  See infra Part 
II.D.  The Kastigar Court suggested that any shaping of the investigation based on 
compelled evidence constituted indirect prohibited use.  But what then constitutes 
non-evidentiary use that alters the shape of the investigation?  Some scholars 
conclude that “a non-evidentiary use is really an indirect evidentiary use that is yet 
to be proven.”  See Douglas A. Turner, Nonevidentiary Use of Immunized 
Testimony: Twenty Years After Kastigar and the Jury Is Still Out, 20 AM. J. CRIM. 
L. 105, 130 (1992).  Lower courts are usually divided on the issue of evidence 
admissibility along the lines of evidentiary and non-evidentiary.  See supra note 
114. 
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prosecution unfolds in a certain sequence because of a compelled 
testimony?  What if the thought processes of a cross-examining 
prosecutor are shaped by an exposure to a compelled testimony and 
subsequently influence his line of questions?  Furthermore, it 
remained difficult to discern the line between evidentiary and non-
evidentiary use once an investigator was exposed to the evidence.129  
A prosecutor can easily work his way backward to establish 
independent ways of obtaining evidence.130  In such instances, the 
prosecution’s proof that evidence was derived from sources 
independent from the compelled testimony often becomes an exercise 
in prosecutorial good faith, rather than a reliable method of inquiry 
worthy of safeguarding a constitutional right. 
But the Court in Kastigar did not find that construing use-
plus-fruits immunity as sufficient to protect the Fifth Amendment 
privilege leads to an increased reliance on prosecutorial good faith.131  
The Court held that the burden placed on the prosecution was to show 
that the evidence came from sources “wholly independent of the 
compelled testimony.”132  According to the Kastigar Court, the 
prosecutorial burden provides sufficient safeguards against 
prosecutors “working backwards” to establish an independent source 
of evidence. 
But the Court did not consider the relative ease with which a 
prosecutor can find the corroboration for a desired result despite the 
prosecutorial burden to establish an independent source of evidence.  
There is a strong informational asymmetry between the prosecution 
and the defendant.  The prosecution controls and shapes the case, 
including selection of the relevant parties.  The prosecution also has 
vast subpoena powers, and it can request oceans of evidence from 
almost unlimited sources.  Once the prosecution knows what it is 
looking for, it is not hard to establish an alternative source of 
evidence amongst the copious evidence previously gathered. 
It is thus an easier burden for the prosecution to shoulder to 
prove an alternative source for evidence once it knows of the 
evidence than it is for the defendant to establish that the prosecution 
worked its way backwards to establish an independent source of the 
evidence.  Indeed, in this instance, there is no reliable way to 
 
129 See infra Part II.D. 
130 See infra note 242. 
131 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460. 
132 Id. 
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distinguish what evidence was derived independently and what was 
arrived at under direct or indirect influence of a compelled 
testimony.133 
D. The Dispute Over The Permissible Uses Of 
Compelled Testimony 
In the decades after the ruling in Kastigar, the lower courts 
puzzled over the scope of Kastigar’s prohibition against any 
prosecutorial use134 of immunized testimony “in any respect.”135  The 
Kastigar Court described the new immunity standard by contrasting 
it with the deficiencies of a use immunity standard136—use immunity 
only could not prevent derivative use.137  Kastigar’s proscription 
against the use of compelled testimony appears to be sweeping at first 
blush—it prohibits “direct or indirect, [use] of the compelled 
testimony and any information derived therefrom.”138 
But Kastigar’s prohibition on direct or indirect use, without 
more, does not provide precise guidance for where to draw the line in 
enforcing the standard.  This is especially true of indirect evidence: at 
what point is evidence sufficiently removed from the testimony that it 
does not violate a witness’s right against self-incrimination?  Does 
reading a testimony by a prosecutor create a per se taint?  Are 
strategic decisions influenced by a compelled testimony an 
impermissible use?  Because of Kastigar’s ambiguities and the 
inherent difficulties in enunciating and applying the proscription 
 
133 See infra notes 237-48 and accompanying text on the use of filter and taint 
teams. 
134 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460. 
135 Id. at 453. 
136 Id.  The Court found that mere use immunity did not prevent the “use of [the 
compelled] testimony to search out other testimony to be used in evidence against 
him.”  Id. at 450.  Nor did it prevent the “use of witnesses and evidence which 
should be attributable directly to the testimony he might give under compulsion . . . 
[or] use of compelled testimony which consists in gaining therefrom a knowledge 
of the details of a crime, and of sources of information which may supply other 
means of convicting the witness or party.”  Id. at 454. 
137 “[B]ecause the immunity granted was incomplete, in that it merely forbade the 
use of the testimony given and failed to protect a witness from future prosecution 
based on knowledge and sources of information obtained from the compelled 
testimony.”  Id. at 454 (quoting Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 437 
(1956)). 
138 Id. at 460. 
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against indirect use in particular, the lower courts have struggled to 
consistently define the scope of Kastigar’s immunity.  Accordingly, 
because the definition of the non-evidentiary use is vague, most 
courts define it by example.139  Some examples of non-evidentiary 
use include prosecutors utilizing the testimonial knowledge to: (1) 
bring an investigation; (2) focus and general shaping of the 
investigation; (3) refuse to plea bargain; (4) interpret evidence; (5) 
plan cross-examination; or otherwise prepare trial strategy.140 
The courts further divided on whether all or any of the types 
of non-evidentiary use are coexistent with the privilege against self-
incrimination.  The leading case that interprets Kastigar as 
proscribing non-evidentiary uses of a compelled testimony is United 
States v. McDaniel.141  McDaniel was a president of a North Dakota 
bank who was subpoenaed to appear before both federal and state 
grand juries to answer questions about his work as a president.142  He 
first testified in front of a grand jury under a grant of immunity, 
divulging a long list of his crimes.143  A federal prosecutor later 
received an immunized copy of McDaniel’s testimony unaware that it 
was, in fact, immunized, and144 the he indicted and convicted 
McDaniel, who later appealed.145  The Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed McDaniel’s conviction even though the evidence 
adduced against him at trial was, according to the prosecution, 
obtained from wholly independent sources.146  The Court interpreted 
Kastigar’s proscription on “any use, direct or indirect,” as prohibiting 
any prosecutorial use of testimony.147  The Court noted that “if the 
immunity protection is to be coextensive with the Fifth Amendment 
privilege, then it must forbid all prosecutorial use of the testimony, 
not merely that which results in the presentation of evidence before 
 
139 See Turner, supra note 128, at 113.  
140 Id. (citing United States v. Rivieccio, 919 F.2d 812, 815 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2852 (1991)). But see United States v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524, 
1531-32 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that government’s incorporation of knowledge 
into indicting or the trial constitutes indirect use). 
141 482 F.2d 305 (8th Cir.1973). 
142 Id. at 307. 
143 Id.  
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 311. 
147 Id. 
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the jury.”148  The Court also remarked that the prosecutor’s reading of 
the compelled testimony “could not be wholly obliterated from the 
prosecutor's mind in his preparation and trial of the case.”149 
The Court in McDaniel decided that Kastigar prohibits and 
non-evidentiary use of compelled testimony, including mere reading 
of the immunized testimony that shaped prosecutorial thought 
process.150  The Court in McDaniel held that where, as in this 
circumstance, the prosecutor thoroughly prepared for a trial not 
knowing that the testimony is compelled, the prosecution’s burden 
under Kastigar was “insurmountable.”151  But McDaniel stopped 
short of saying that that prosecutorial familiarity with a compelled 
testimony established per se taint.  Other courts have since followed 
McDaniel in prohibiting non-evidentiary use that may have 
tangentially influenced the trial strategy or prosecutor’s thinking.152 
 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 312. 
150 Id.  According to the Court, non-evidentiary use includes “assistance in focusing 
the investigation, deciding to initiate prosecution, refusing to plea-bargain, 
interpreting evidence, planning cross-examination, and otherwise generally 
planning trial strategy.”  Id. at 311. 
151 Id. 
152 United States v. Semkiw, 712 F.2d 891, 895 (3d Cir.1983) (stating possible non-
evidentiary uses, the Court concluded the record did not show that the prosecution 
and the defendant remained in substantially the same position as if defendant had 
never testified); United States v. Pantone, 634 F.2d 716, 722 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(suggesting that the prosecutor’s access to the immunized testimony that provides 
psychological motivation he would otherwise lack could constitute impermissible 
use); United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 859-60 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (suggesting 
that a Kastigar violation occurs not when a prosecutor’s limited exposure has a 
mere tangential influence on his thoughts about a case, but rather when he makes 
significant non-evidentiary use of the testimony); United States v. Hsia, 131 F. 
Supp. 2d 195, 201-02 (D.D.C. 2001) (holding that Kastigar and North prohibit non-
evidentiary uses of immunized testimony);  United States v. Smith, 580 F. Supp. 
1418, 1421 (D.N.J. 1984) (stating that the government has an “‘affirmative duty’ of 
showing that it did not and will not exploit the immunized testimony in more 
subtle, elusive ways”).  But see United States v. Slough, 641 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 
2011) (potentially distinguishing North).  The Court in Slough held that “[n]either 
Kastigar nor North states that non-evidentiary uses of immunized statements are 
barred.”  Id. at 553.  Rather, the Court stated that many uses that may have been 
lumped under “non-evidentiary use” in North or in the District Courts decision in 
Slough, such as refreshing memories of a witness with evidentiary testimony or 
evidence presented to the grand jury thar was discovered by the immunized 
testimony, were indirect uses prohibited by Kastigar.  Id. at 554. 
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But several other courts rejected McDaniel’s proposition that 
non-evidentiary use of a compelled testimony falls within Kastigar’s 
proscription.  These courts argue that immunity must only protect 
against evidentiary uses.  The First Circuit rejected the view that “all 
non-evidentiary use necessarily violates the Fifth Amendment.”153  
The First Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit that prosecution 
should be solely because “’immunized testimony might have 
tangentially influenced the prosecutor's thought processes in 
preparing the indictment and preparing for trial.’”154  But at the same 
time, the Court did not foreclose the possibility that “certain non-
evidentiary uses of immunized testimony may so prejudice the 
defendant as to warrant dismissal of the indictment . . . .”155  The 
Second Circuit, on the other hand, explicitly rejected tangential non-
evidentiary uses,156 yet it never rejected other non-evidentiary uses.157 
 By contrast, the Eleventh Circuit, comparing its decision to 
those in McDaniel and Semkiw, held that “the privilege against self-
incrimination is concerned with direct and indirect evidentiary uses 
of compelled testimony, and not with the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion.”158  But the Eleventh Circuit’s definition of “evidentiary” 
use is ambiguous—the court insisted that evidentiary use under 
Kastigar encompasses “investigatory” uses that could be reasonably 
considered non-evidentiary.159  Just as the Eleventh Circuit, the 
Seventh Circuit, too, stated that “the mere tangential influence that 
privileged information may have on the prosecutor's thought process 
in preparing for trial is not an impermissible ‘use’ of that 
 
153 United States v. Serrano, 870 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1989). 
154 Id. at 17-18 (quoting United States v. Mariani, 851 F.2d 595, 600 (2d Cir. 
1988)). 
155 Id. at 17. 
156 United States v. Mariani, 851 F.2d 595, 600 (1988).  
157 In United States v. Schwimmer, the Second Circuit cited with approval both the 
Eighth Circuit’s decision in McDaniel and Third Circuit’s decision in Semkiw, in 
warning the government about potential hazards of non-evidentiary uses that may 
“assist the prosecutor in focusing additional investigation, planning, cross-
examination, or otherwise generally mapping a strategy for retrial.”  882 F.2d 22, 
26 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing U.S. v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 311 (8th Cir.1973) and 
Semkiw, 712 F.2d at 895). 
158 United States v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524, 1531 (11th Cir. 1985). 
159 See United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citing United 
States v. Hampton, 775 F.2d 1479, 1490–91 n.53 (11th Cir.1985)). 
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information.”160  The Seventh Circuit further stated that “[t]here is no 
question that Kastigar bars not only evidentiary use of compelled 
testimony but also non-evidentiary, or derivative, use of the same.”161 
Even through the differences among the circuits as to what 
types of evidence fall within the constitutionally proscribed immunity 
grant are often described as a split,162 there may be more similarities 
amongst the circuits than is apparent.  The circuits that rejected the 
non-evidentiary standard did not do so categorically, but they left 
open the possibility that certain non-evidentiary uses could amount to 
a Kastigar violation.  Second, the definitions of non-evidentiary uses 
are inconsistent across the circuits.  Some circuits find certain 
evidence use that could be reasonable considered a non-evidentiary 
use, and thus outside the scope of Kastigar’s protection, an indirect 
use that is allowed.163 
A review of circuits’ practices shows that it matters more 
whether the use is merely tangential or whether it has a discernible 
bearing on potentially incriminating evidence, than whether use is 
“evidentiary” or not.  The linguistic exercise of defining what use is 
direct or indirect, evidentiary or non-evidentiary, has not succeeded 
in producing a workable definition as to either type of uses.  And no 
court was willing to completely foreclose itself from the possibility 
that no non-evidentiary uses will not be within Kastigar’s 
prohibition.  Therefore, the courts’ inquiry in determining the scope 
of the Kastigar immunity should move away from a categorical 
inquiry about whether a use is evidentiary or not to a functionalist 
and qualitative inquiry.  The confusing categorization of what is 
evidentiary and non-evidentiary use should be avoided altogether.  
Only a qualitative inquiry that considers the implications of a 
testimonial use can capture the most relevant question in Kastigar 
and Murphy—whether the witness is “in substantially the same 
position as if the witness had claimed his privilege in the absence of a 
 
160 United States v. Bolton, 977 F.2d 1196, 1199 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting United 
States v. Velasco, 953 F.2d 1467, 1474 (7th Cir.1992)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
161 United States v. Cozzi, 613 F.3d 725, 730 (7th Cir. 2010). 
162 See generally CRIMINAL PRACTICE MANUAL § 89:10 (3d ed. 2021); CRIMINAL 
PRACTICE MANUAL § 8.11(c) (4th ed. 2020); see also Turner, supra note 128, at 
116. 
163 See Hampton, 775 F.2d at 1490–91 n.53. 
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state grant of immunity.”164  Kastigar did not describe what particular 
types of evidence are excluded.  Instead, the Kastigar Court asked 
what effect the use has on the foregone self-incrimination right.  The 
immunity, according to the Court, is a mere exchange token, no more 
or no less protective than the scope of the Fifth Amendment itself.  
And given the important historical role that the amendment played in 
the history of the common law and the United States’ substantive 
law,165 the Court’s protective measures to safeguard the right should 
always lean toward a greater margin of protection. 
A broad view of the Kastigar immunity is consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Hubbell.166  In Hubbell, 
the Court determined that the scope of an immunity grant is large—it 
includes the production of documents in response to a subpoena 
where the defendant had to identify the documents, making extensive 
use of “the contents of his own mind.”167  The Supreme Court refused 
to separate the production of documents from its testimonial aspect, 
likening assembling of the subpoenaed documents to “telling an 
inquisitor the combination to a wall safe,” and unlike “being forced to 
surrender the key to a strongbox.”168  The Court further regarded the 
Government’s view of the “act of production as a mere physical act 
that is principally nontestimonial in character,” and that can be 
“entirely divorced from its ‘implicit’ testimonial aspect,” “anemic” 
and divorced from the realities of the act of production in this case.169 
In Hubbell, the Supreme Court refused to separate the act of 
production from its testimonial character, emphasizing the qualitative 
aspects of the inquiry that determines the scope of the Fifth 
Amendment protection for an immunized testimony: “The 
testimonial aspect of respondent's act of production was the first step 
in a chain of evidence leading to this prosecution.”170  Justice 
 
164 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 457 (1972) (quoting Murphy v. 
Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964)). 
165 See supra Parts II.A, II.B. 
166 530 U.S. 27 (2000). 
167 Id. at 43 (quoting Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957)). 
168 Id.  A combination conveys the contents of one’s mind and is therefore 
testimonial.  On the other hand, a key, in these circumstances, does not reveal 
contents of one’s mind and is therefore not testimonial and protected within the 
scope of the Fifth Amendment.  See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 n.9 
(1988). 
169 Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43. 
170 Id. at 28-29. 
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Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, reaffirmed in his concurrence such 
broad reading of the self-incrimination privilege based on the historic 
use and precedent: “Fifth Amendment privilege protects against the 
compelled production not just of incriminating testimony, but of any 
incriminating evidence.”171  The Justices went so far as to state that in 
a future case, they would be willing to reconsider the scope and 




III. THE CORPORATE PROSECUTION TRENDS: WHO IS BEING 
PUNISHED? 
The rise, peak, and aftermath of the financial crisis in the 
increasingly globalized world brought important changes to the way 
the government interacts with private institutions.173  A decade of 
large-scale settlements was succeeded by an increased demand for 
individual prosecutions, tightening the link between the government 
and banks nationally and internationally. 174  
The increased cooperation between the government and 
corporations in turn increased the government’s access to information 
about employees, without the corresponding increased protections for 
the corporate employees.175  The government’s individual 
prosecutions moreover did not punish the heads of companies.176  
Rather, they targeted the more ordinary rank-and-file employees,177 
who are becoming the least protected in the world where cooperation 
between large companies and governments strengthens.178 
A decade after the financial crisis and despite increased 
financial regulation since the 2008 recession, the Department of 
Justice’s (“DOJ”) white-collar prosecutions fell to their lowest in 
twenty years, reflecting a broader steadily declining trend from the 
 
171 Id. at 49 (Thomas, J. & Scalia, J., concurring). 
172 Id.  
173 See supra notes 168-173 and accompanying text. 
174 See infra notes 185-90 and accompanying text. 
175 See infra notes 194-97 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IV.B.  
176 See infra notes 196-97 and accompanying text. 
177 See infra note 201 and accompanying text. 
178 See infra notes 196-99, 202-11; see also infra Part IV.B. 
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past few years.179  But the trend is more complicated than a simple 
trend in the rise and the fall of prosecutions.  The past three decades 
in corporate prosecutions were marked by many important changes.  
Starting in the 1990s, when prosecuting corporations was a relatively 
novel phenomenon, and progressing to the 2000s when the DOJ 
revolutionized using large-scale settlements in corporate prosecutions 
with deferred and non-prosecution agreements.180 
At the same time, the number and scope of large-scale cross-
border actions that drive the corporate investigations and subsequent 
settlements grew.  The United States became increasingly involved 
with its foreign counterparts in investigating the multi-national 
crimes that affect the United States, often engaging in parallel cross-
border investigations.  The statistics show that in 2017 the Criminal 
Division’s Fraud Division of the DOJ accrued “over 50 pending 
parallel investigations in over 40 different jurisdictions and involving 
over 50 different foreign regulatory and law enforcement 
authorities.”181  For example, “the U.S. Department of Justice 
revealed that bribery cases now routinely involve four or five 
countries.”182  The five largest bribery settlements in 2016 and 2017 
not only concerned foreign companies, but were conducted in 
cooperation with foreign authorities.183  The United States 
prosecutors are now additionally becoming embedded in international 
organizations and even within sovereign government’s enforcement 
bodies.184   
These large cross-border investigations exert great pressure 
on the companies under investigation to settle as evidence and 
witnesses become available internationally, and the governments’ 
 
179 See White Collar Prosecutions Fall to Lowest in 20 Years, TRACREPORTS (May 
24, 2018), https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/514/.  The declining trend continued 
in year 2019.  Id. 
180 See BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE 
WITH CORPORATIONS 1-18 (2014) (providing an overview of the changing approach 
towards corporate prosecution during the 1990s through 2000s). 
181 Emily T. Carlson, The (not-so) “Brave New World of International Criminal 
Enforcement”: The Intricacies of Multi-Jurisdictional White-Collar Investigations, 
84 BROOK. L. REV. 299, 311 (2018). 
182 Evan Norris & Alma Mozetic, How Enforcement Authorities Interact, GLOB. 




184 See infra note 247. 
32
Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 3 [], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss3/7
2021 GLOBALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION 1289 
forces join in targeting crime.  Many of such large-scale prosecutions 
ended in even larger settlements.  In 2015, an astounding number of 
banks—eighty to be exact—settled cases brought against them by the 
government using plea agreements or deferred–prosecution 
agreements.185  Banks represented about half of all prosecution 
agreements in 2015, and these settlements paid the majority of the $9 
billion of prosecutions’ fees the government levied that year.  The 
fees included some of the famously large settlements such as: $625 
million paid by Deutsche Bank in an antitrust case, $641 million paid 
by Commerzbank, or $156 million paid by Crédit Agricole in money 
laundering and export violation cases.186  The settlements appeared to 
be advantageous agreements between the government and the banks.  
The government collected large fees, and the companies, facing 
potentially ruinous lawsuits, eagerly cooperated and paid large 
settlements.187 
Almost for a decade since the financial crisis, the government 
has been levying hefty financial fees through the official settlement 
policy.188  Despite these penalties, the Department of Justice faced 
criticism for the lack of individual accountability in corporate 
prosecution cases189 and for the recidivism committed by these 
financial institutions,190 which signaled to the public that despite the 
penalties, little has changed inside the banks.  This criticism 
 
185 Brandon L. Garrett, The Rise of Bank Prosecutions, 126 YALE L.J. 33, 37 
(2016). 
186 Id. 
187 See infra Part III.A. 
188 In 2015, corporations paid record fines exceeding $9 billion in penalties to 
federal prosecutors; $7 billion from this sum was paid by banks. Overall, over $22 
million in penalties have been paid to the federal prosecutors from 2011 to 2015 
and over $15 billion was paid just in the last five years of the time period from 
2011 to 2015.  See Garrett, supra note 185, at 35-36. 
189 Brandon L. Garrett, Declining Corporate Prosecutions, 57 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
109, 112 (2020). 
190 See Garrett, supra note 185, at 42.  For example, Barclays entered into a 
deferred prosecution agreement in 2010, a non-prosecution agreement in 2012, and 
a guilty plea pending.  Id.  Crédit Suisse signed a deferred prosecution agreement in 
2009 and a plea agreement in 2014.  Id.  HSBC entered a non-prosecution 
agreement in 2001.  Id.  UBS entered into a deferred prosecution agreement in 
2009, a non-prosecution agreement in 2011, a non-prosecution agreement in 2012, 
a guilty plea by a subsidiary in 2013.  Id.  Wachovia entered a deferred prosecution 
agreement in 2010 and a non-prosecution agreement in 2011.  Id.  Lloyds agreed to 
a deferred prosecution agreement in 2009 and a deferred prosecution agreement in 
2014.  Id. 
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prompted the former Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates to issue a 
Memorandum outlining a new focus on individual prosecutions.191  
This renewed concentration on individuals remained, according to the 
Trump Administration, a focal point of the DOJ’s prosecutions.192 
The increased focus on individuals brought greater 
cooperation with the banks, nationally and internationally, where on 
one side the government is hoping to convict culprits to assuage the 
public criticisms, and on the other side, the banks are trying to do 
anything that could win favorable treatment from the government. 
Indeed, the DOJ emphasized the importance of “true” 
corporate cooperation that provides “evidence against” the “culpable 
individuals.”193  The incentives for the private institutions to 
cooperate to their utmost are also clear.  The 2015 Yates 
Memorandum stated that “for a company to receive any consideration 
for cooperation . . . the company must completely disclose to the 
Department all relevant facts about individual misconduct.194  The 
corporations are therefore incentivized to turn over the most 
information possible about their employees at the government’s 
request with the hope of securing favorable settlement conditions. 
 
191 See Memorandum from Sally Q. Yates, the Deputy Att’y Gen. on Individual 
Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing, Dep’t of Just. (Sept. 9, 2015). 
192 Matt Zapotosky, Sessions: Focus on Violent Crime Doesn’t Mean Lax 
Enforcement for White-collar Offenses, WASH. POST (April 24, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/sessions-focus-on-
violent-crime-doesnt-mean-lax-enforcement-for-white-collar-
offenses/2017/04/24/d36d4034-2906-11e7-be51-b3fc6ff7faee_story.html.  Former 
Attorney General Jeff Sessions stated that individual white-collar prosecutions 
remain DOJ’s priority despite widely advertised focus on violent offenses, and drug 
and immigration violations.  Id.  Subsequently, the Deputy Attorney General Rod J. 
Rosenstein re-iterated that prosecuting corporate individuals remains an important 
deterrent for wrongdoing.  See Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., Remarks at 
the American Conference Institute’s 35th International Conference on the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 29, 2018) (“Under our revised policy, pursuing 
individuals responsible for wrongdoing will be a top priority in every corporate 
investigation. . . . But the deterrent impact on the individual people responsible for 
wrongdoing is sometimes attenuated in corporate prosecutions. Corporate cases 
often penalize innocent employees and shareholders without effectively punishing 
the human beings responsible for making corrupt decisions.”). 
193 Marshall L. Miller., Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Remarks at the 
American Conference Institute’s 35th International Conference on the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 29, 2018). 
194 See Yates, supra note 191, at 3. 
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The Connolly case from 2018, discussed later in this Article, 
was not the first case where the U.S. government offered lenient 
treatment in exchange for the company’s zealous cooperation or 
waiver of an employee’s privilege.  Already in 2006 in United States 
v. Stein I,195 Judge Kaplan of the Southern District of New York 
strongly reproached the government for coercing the accounting firm 
KPMG into interfering with its employees’ Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel and the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.196  
Kaplan found that the DOJ’s policy memo followed in this case—the 
Thompson Memorandum—interfered with the defendants’ Fifth 
Amendment right to due process and Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel because it allowed the government to judge KPMG’s 
cooperation on its decision whether pay the attorneys’ fees.197  In the 
second opinion issued in Stein, the court held that the KPMG 
employees who had been threatened with termination of their jobs 
and payment of legal fees if they did not speak to the government, 
made  their statements under coercion directly attributable to the 
government.198 
Despite the government’s resolve to prosecute individuals, the 
overall white-collar prosecutions declined, but the individual 
prosecutions amounted to a mere fraction of all government white-
collar prosecutions.  The composition of the convicted white-collar 
wrongdoers offers a telling picture of who is prosecuted.  It is not the 
corporate chief executive officers (“CEOs”) or executive managers. 
From 2001 to 2014, the prosecutors in the United States 
entered into 306 deferred prosecution agreements with companies—
only 104  included individual prosecutions, amounting to 414 
individuals prosecuted.199  Of the individuals charged, the majority 
did not consist of CEOs and other higher-up corporate officers, but 
rather middle managers and individuals with low-ranking corporate 
positions.  Out of 414 individual prosecutions from 2001 until 2013, 
only one-third included individuals who held positions with 
 
195 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
196 See id.; Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: 
Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 53, 54 (2007). 
197 Bharara, supra note 196, at 98. 
198 Id. at 98-99. 
199 The 104 criminal cases were accompanied by 414 individual prosecutions.  See 
Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV. 1789, 
1802 (2015). 
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significant managerial responsibilities, twenty-six were CEOs, 
thirteen were presidents, twenty-eight were chief financial officers, 
and fifty-nine were vice presidents.200 
Moreover, the growing cooperation between the banks and 
the companies created an environment where the prosecutors have a 
remarkable access to companies’ internal information about the 
employees.  But the government’s access did not lead to holding the 
most powerful and the guilty individuals—corporate executives and 
top managers— accountable.  On the contrary, the individuals who 
are often marched into courtrooms are not the ones directing 
misconduct, or even those with the most knowledge of the crimes.  
The higher-ups are valuable sources of knowledge who can aid the 
prosecutors to obtain several convictions, which could in turn 
dampen the public criticism. They are therefore more likely to 
receive a government plea offer for their cooperation.  The 
arrangements also raise a separate concern that the higher-ups get 
favorable deals in exchange for throwing the mid-level employees 
“under the bus.” 
In addition to the settlement and cooperation policies, the 
courts have also aided the expansion of the government and corporate 
cooperation at the expense of the employees’ rights.  According to 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Upjohn Co. v. United States,201 the 
corporation, not the individual, retains attorney-client and work 
product privilege.202  The corporation can lift this privilege when the 
government so demands and grant the government access to the 
information it otherwise could not reach.203  And more often than not, 
the government rewards such helpful corporate cooperation.204  The 
corporate employees often speak with a company’s in-house counsel 
 
200 Id. at 1802-03. 
201 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
202 Id. at 390.  This is to the contrary of the Supreme Court’s otherwise protective 
attitude towards the attorney-client privilege against government encroachment. 
See generally Swindler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998) 
(stating that the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to promote public 
observance of the law by “full and frank communication between attorneys and 
their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law 
and the administration of justice” and refusing to pierce the privilege after the 
attorney’s death). 
203 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394-95. 
204 See Yates, supra note 191; see also Garrett, supra note 199, at 1844-45. 
204 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394-95. 
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before the government comes knocking on the door.205  In such 
interviews, the employee does not receive any constitutional 
protections, and she often has no legal representation, and may not 
even be aware that anything she will say may result in a criminal 
liability.206  Frequently then, the individual unwittingly incriminates 
herself because the company’s policies oblige her to speak with the 
corporate counsel, and the incriminating evidence is then turned over 
to the government.207 
.   Companies commonly have “talk or walk” policies that 
allow for termination of employees who do not follow them.208  Such 
corporate interviews, however, may not adequately safeguard 
employees’ constitutional rights where it is the government that 
directs the investigation.  Instead, a corporation may be “bending 
over backward and kissing [the government’s] tush to satisfy the 
government””209 in a hope of a favorable settlement while the 
employee faces the catastrophic choice between being interrogated de 
facto by the Government without any self-incrimination guarantees or 
the termination.  These pressures, together with the government’s 
outsourcing of investigative powers, facilitate erosion of the Fifth 
Amendment rights of the employees caught in the middle, where the 
large banks settle, and the top management gets a favorable 
cooperation agreement. 
 
205 Garrett, supra note 199 at 1824-25. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208 See Garrett, supra note 199, at 1825.  See also Sigal P. Mandelker et al., 
Employee Rights: The US Perspective, GLOB. INVESTIGATIONS REV. (Jan. 4, 2017), 
https://globalinvestigationsreview.com/chapter/1079306/employee-rights-the-us-
perspective; see also United States v. Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006) (finding that the KPMG employees, who had been threatened with 
termination of their jobs and payment of legal fees if they did not speak to the 
government, made their statements under coercion directly attributable to the 
government). 
209 Judge McMahon’s remark on account of Deutsche Bank’s cooperative effort 
with the U.S. government in the LIBOR prosecutions. Transcript of Record at 361, 
l. 14-15, United States v. Connolly, No. 16 Cr. 0370, 2019 WL 2120523 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 2, 2019). 
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A. The Privatization of the Government’s 
Investigations 
The companies’ cooperation with the government in hope of 
gaining a favorable settlement plays out against the backdrop of the 
enormous pressure that the United States government places on the 
companies to induce cooperation.210  The potential costs for the 
government and the corporations are great.  Subsequently, the 
settlement agreements between the government and companies create 
a co-dependent relationship between the government and the 
companies.  The government faces public pressure to prosecute 
corporate individuals in a tumultuous era of financial scandals, and 
the companies are vigorously avoiding the “fatal prospect” of 
indictment.211  Admittedly, potential losses of big corporations hardly 
elicit public sympathy.  Still, the consequences for a business that 
fights a case all the way to a trial can be ruinous.  Such consequences 
impact the companies’ willingness to cooperate with aim to settle as 
soon as possible.  Even though a trial may seem negligible for a 
multi-billion-dollar corporation, it is not so because a corporation is 
not affected solely by potential costs and fees associated with a trial.  
The good reputation of a firm amongst investors perpetuates its 
success.  A dragged-out trial can result in irreversible damage to a 
company’s stock price, rating, or client retention, before a case ever 
reaches the verdict.212 
 
210 Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal 
Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 312 (2007).  Since at least the early 2000s, the 
government has adopted a strategy focused on punitive regulations and created the 
Corporate Crime Task Force which releases annual scorecards that tally the 
numbers of convictions, the total fines, and the number of corporate defendants 
charged.  Id.  The effect of this power to indict and levy destructive fines has been 
widely recognized.  See generally George Ellard, Making the Silent Speak and the 
Informed Wary, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 985, 987 (2005) (describing corporate 
indictment as “lethal even for venerable institutions”); see also United States v. 
Stein II, 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating that by threatening 
KPMG with indictment—“the corporate equivalent of capital punishment”—the 
government left KPMG no real choice but to pressure its employees to waive their 
constitutional rights). 
211 United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 142 (2d Cir. 2008). 
212 Abbe David Lowell & Christopher D. Man, Federalizing Corporate Internal 
Investigations and the Erosion of Employees’ Fifth Amendment Rights, 40 GEO. 
L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, vi (2011). 
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The post-Enron example of Arthur Andersen Co. stands as a 
cautionary tale of a financial services firm that did not cooperate with 
the government and went bankrupt213 before the verdict was ever 
overturned.214  And the government had not shied away from publicly 
predicting the consequences of Andersen’s non-cooperation.  At the 
time when Anderson picked a fight with the government, a different 
bank—Merrill Lynch—decided to instead enter into a settlement 
agreement.215  The DOJ’s Assistant Attorney General offered an 
insight on the two companies’ standing: “There's a right way and a 
wrong way to respond when the government comes knocking at your 
door.”216  Clearly, Andersen picked the wrong way. 
Unquestionably then, the government exerts pressure on the 
corporations to cooperate, but it is not the question of pressure per se 
that warrants caution.  It is individual, not corporate, rights that are at 
stake.  After all, criminal subjects are routinely exposed to pressure to 
expose wrongdoing.217  It is the degree and type of coercion, 
particularly one that erodes constitutional rights of a third party, that 
may come in the shadow of such coercion-cooperation models.  
Recent caselaw—United States v. Allen and United States v. 
Connolly—suggests that federal courts found such infringements had 
already occurred. 
 
B. The Mechanism of Attributing Private Action to 
Government in the Fifth-Amendment Context 
There is a legal framework for attributing government action 
to that of a private actor if the private actor takes on a substantive 
function of the government.  The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Garrity v. New Jersey218 extended the Fifth Amendment privilege 
 
213 Stein II, 440 F. Supp. at 337.  Commentators noted finality of reputational 
damages of an indictment in a financial services industry is such that even a 
Supreme Court’s unanimous reversal of the conviction could not resurrect the firm.  
See Ellard, supra note 162, at 211. 
214 See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 698 (2005). 
215 Griffin, supra note 211, at 327. 
216 Id.at 327 n.80. 
217 See Bharara, supra note 196, at 88. 
218 385 U.S. 493 (1967).  
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against self-incrimination to government employees.219  But the 
guarantees against self-incrimination were not always extended to 
public employees, let alone the private ones.  In Garrity, the Supreme 
Court held that “statements obtained under the threat of removal from 
office” could not be used in subsequent criminal proceedings against 
the defendant.220  The Court found the choice between self-
incrimination and job loss, or a threat thereof, coercive,221 stating that 
“[t]he option to lose one’s means of livelihood or to pay the penalty 
of self-incrimination is the antithesis of free choice to speak out or 
remain silent.”222 
The Court in Garrity based the decision on two constitutional 
grounds.  First, it held that the coerced choice between job 
termination or potentially incriminating testimony violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment requirements.223  Second, the Court found 
that the state’s threat to fire the officers unless they provided 
 
219 See Donald P. Taylor, Between the Rock and the Whirlpool: Compelled 
Statements by Public Employees, 30 LAB. L.J. 148, 150 (2009).  
220 Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500.  In Garrity, two police officers in the New Jersey 
boroughs were investigated for their ticket-fixing practices and eventually 
convicted in two trials of conspiracy to obstruct state motor traffic laws.  Id.  
During the investigation process, the officers were brought for questioning by the 
district attorney, whereby they were each warned that their respective statements 
could be used against them in a criminal proceeding.  Id.  The officers were 
informed of their right to remain silent but they were also told that their refusal to 
answer questions could result in their removal from office.  Id. 
221 Id. at 496.  By applying a voluntariness test, the Court in Garrity found that the 
threat of loss of employment disabled the officers from “making a free and rational 
choice.”  Id. at 496-98.  The Court described the circumstances under which the 
defendant was acting as “[w]here the choice is between the rock and the whirlpool, 
duress is inherent . . . it always is for the interest of a party under duress to choose 
the lesser of two evils.  [This] does not exclude duress.”  Id. at 498. 
222 Id. at 497. 
223 Id. at 496.  “We now hold the protection of the individual under the Fourteenth 
Amendment against coerced statements prohibits use in subsequent criminal 
proceedings of statements obtained under threat of removal from office, and that it 
extends to all, whether they are policemen or other members of our body politic.”  
Id. at 500. 
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statements was an unconstitutional condition.224  Since then, all U.S. 
circuits that addressed the issue held that “a government employee 
who has been threatened with an adverse employment action by her 
employer for failure to answer questions put to her by her employer 
receives immunity from the use of her statements or their fruits in 
subsequent criminal proceedings.”225  
The mechanisms for invoking the Fifth Amendment 
protection in situations where government acts through a third-party, 
such as corporate counsel conducting an internal investigation, 
mimics compelled testimony situations.  As in compelled-by-the-
government situations, the courts also held that, under the Garrity 
framework if a defendant shows she was compelled to testify by her 
 
224 Id.  Some commentators introduced the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as 
an avenue to understand Garrity.  See Donald W. Driscoll, Garrity v. New Jersey 
and Its Progeny: How Lower Courts Are Weakening the Strong Constitutional 
Protections Afforded Police Officers, 22 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 101, 111 (2003).  The 
doctrine holds that state or federal government cannot offer a benefit on a condition 
that a recipient engages in or abstains from an activity that the Constitution 
prohibits or that the Constitution prohibits from demanding.  Id. at 113 (citing Perry 
v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 587 (1972)). 
225 Sher v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 488 F.3d 489, 501-02 (1st Cir. 2007); see 
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 45 F.3d 343, 348 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that 
statements obtained from an employee under a threat of dismissal were subject to 
use and derivative use immunity); United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1433 n.13 
(9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he Supreme Court has recognized that the Fifth Amendment 
protection against coerced statements extends to public employees who must 
choose either to incriminate themselves or to forfeit their jobs during an 
administrative hearing.”); United States v. Veal, 153 F.3d 1233, 1256 n.4 (11th 
Cir.1998) (“The Fifth Amendment protection afforded by Garrity to an accused 
who reasonably believes that he may lose his job if he does not answer 
investigation questions is Supreme Court-created and self-executing;  it arises by 
operation of law;  no authority or statute needs to grant it.”); Unifd. Sanitation Men 
Ass’n, Inc. v. Comm’r of Sanitation, 426 F.2d 619, 627 (2d Cir. 1970) (“[T]heir 
right, conferred by the Fifth Amendment itself, as construed in Garrity, is simply 
that neither what they say under such compulsion nor its fruits can be used against 
them in a subsequent prosecution.”); Hoover v. Knight, 678 F.2d 578, 581 (5th Cir. 
1982) (quoting Luman v. Tanzler, 411 F.2d at 167) (“At the administrative hearing 
[the officer] will have a free choice to admit, deny, or refuse to answer.  This is full 
vindication of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.”); Carney 
v. City of Springfield, 532 N.E.2d 631, 634 n.5 (Mass. 1988) (citing Garrity to 
affirm that “[i]nformal ‘immunity’ under the Fifth Amendment . . . can also arise 
where public employees are compelled to answer questions narrowly and 
specifically related to their job performance.”).  For a comprehensive survey of the 
courts’ holdings, see also Steven D. Clymer, Compelled Statements From. Police 
Officers and Garrity Immunity, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309, 1318 n.32 (2001). 
41
Resar Krasulova: Globalization and Privatization
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center,
1298 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 37 
employer acting on behest of the government, the “government must 
show that any evidence used or derived has a legitimate source 
wholly independent of the compelled testimony.”226  Such 
increasingly common scenarios place employees “between the rock 
and the whirlpool” where the employee must choose between 
potential job loss if she does not answer her employer’s question and 
possible self-incrimination if she does.227 
The employee’s protection against answering questions about 
his potentially damning conduct are not limitless.  If there is no threat 
of termination, an employee can be still required to answer even 
potentially incriminating questions.228  Companies and governments, 
in the case of public employees, have a strong interest in maintaining 
internal control and power to speak to their employees in order to 
correct mistakes and improve management.  Such control need only 
be restricted in situations where such information is used for a 
potential indictment by a government. 
Companies’ counsels should therefore be wary of such 
cooperation with the government and strive to protect certain 
information.  The government, on the other hand, will not be 
incapacitated when such protections are put in place.  The 
government can always conduct parallel investigations or time the 
interviews so that it can speak with an employee before the in-house 
counsel, if the government wants to direct the investigations.  If the 
government still decides to steer the private counsel and compel a 
testimony knowing that an employee will be compelled, that is he 
will answer under a threat of job loss—implicit or explicit, the 
government should simply consider coordinating an appropriate grant 
of immunity. 
 
226 United States v. Motes, 551 F.3d 763, 766 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Kastigar v. 
United States, 406 U.S. 441, 457 (1972)). 
227 Garrity, 385 U.S. at 498. 
228 See, e.g., Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 278 (1968) (“If appellant, a 
policeman, had refused to answer questions specifically, directly, and narrowly 
relating to the performance of his official duties, without being required to waive 
his immunity with respect to the use of his answers or the fruits thereof in a 
criminal prosecution of himself, Garrity v. New Jersey, supra, the privilege against 
self-incrimination would not have been a bar to his dismissal.”). 
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C. The High Costs of Safeguarding A Compelled 
Testimony  
There are significant costs and unproven efficacy associated 
with the current system of handling compelled statements 
domestically.  Today, the United States’ prosecuting authorities must 
grant a compelled witness a use-plus-fruits testimony—also known as 
the Kastigar immunity.  The Kastigar Court settled on this immunity 
requirement to “rational[ly] accommodate[e] between the imperatives 
of the privilege and the legitimate demands of government to compel 
citizens to testify.”229  A prosecution of a compelled witness therefore 
is not foreclosed, as was the case in the first half of the last century.  
But if the government decides to prosecute, it must meet the “heavy 
burden”230 which is to “prove that the evidence it proposes to use is 
derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the 
compelled testimony.”231 
The government’s burden to prove the admissibility of 
evidence in compelled testimony situations is much like the coerced 
confessions cases.  Once the defendant establishes that his testimony 
was coerced or compelled, the burden shifts to the government to 
establish that the evidence is derived independently from this 
confession.232  The government can provide a direct proof to satisfy 
this burden—that is to show that the investigatory team has not been 
exposed to the compelled evidence.233  But even if the prosecution’s 
team was exposed to the evidence, the prosecution still gets a chance 
to prove to the court that this exposure did not “taint” the 
 
229 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 446. 
230 Id. at 461.  But see Justice Marshall’s dissent in Kastigar that suggests that the 
burden may not be all that heavy for a governmental actor.  Id. at 468-69 (Marshall, 
J., dissenting).  
231 Id. at 460. 
232 Id. at 461-62.  
233 United States v. North I, 910 F.2d 843, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (finding that 
prosecution can discharge its Kastigar burden by showing that the witness was 
never exposed to the coerced confession). 
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investigation.234  However, if the prosecution cannot affirmatively 
disprove taint, a court can, depending on the seriousness and timing 
of the violation, dismiss the case or reverse a conviction.235 
 
234 United States v. Pantone, 634 F.2d 716, 722 (3d Cir. 1980).  Many courts assert 
that a mere exposure to the compelled testimony does not taint the prosecuting 
team or the witnesses.  Id. (“We do not believe that mere access to immunized 
grand jury testimony prevents the government from carrying its burden under 
Kastigar.”); United States v. North II, 920 F.2d 940, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“Some 
[witnesses] might convincingly testify that their exposure had no effect on their 
trial or grand jury testimony.”).  But as pointed out in Section I.D. of this Article, 
there is an ongoing and unresolved dispute about the scope of the admissible 
evidence under immunity grant. 
235 The remedy for a violation of a Kastigar immunity depends on the seriousness 
of the violation.  A majority of courts agree that where the use of immunized 
testimony was harmless, dismissal is not required.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Schmidgall, 25 F.3d 1523, 1528 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Serrano, 870 
F.2d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that dismissal is not warranted where the use of 
immunized testimony was “harmless, beyond reasonable doubt”); United States v. 
Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524, 1529 n.8 (11th Cir.1985) (same); United States v. Beery, 678 
F.2d 856, 860 n.3 (10th Cir.1982) (same).  The courts were split on the issue 
whether a grand jury’s exposure to immunized testimony or derivative evidence 
warrants a dismissal of the indictment.  See, e.g., North I, 910 F.2d at 873 (holding 
that where tainted evidence is introduced to the grand jury, “the indictment must be 
dismissed”); United States v. Hampton, 775 F.2d 1479, 1490 (11th Cir.1985) 
(dismissing an indictment where the government failed to affirmatively show 
independent sources); United States v. Palumbo, 897 F.2d 245, 251 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(same); United States v. Garrett, 797 F.2d 656, 665 (8th Cir.1986) (same).  But see 
United States v. Zielezinski, 740 F.2d 727, 729-33 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that 
indictment by the same jury that was exposed to the compelled testimony or 
evidence derived thereof is not an automatic Fifth Amendment violation but instead 
requires an evidentiary hearing where the government can prove the evidence was 
derived from independent sources); United States v. Garrett, 797 F.2d 656, 663-65 
(8th Cir. 1986) (same).  The Second Circuit held in United States v. Rivieccio that 
the use of compelled testimony before a grand jury does not require dismissal.  919 
F.2d 812, 816 n.4 (2d Cir. 1990).  But this holding was recently overturned by in 
United States v. Allen where Judge Cabranes found that, pursuant to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in United States v. Hubbell, where government made use of the 
compelled testimony, a dismissal was required.  864 F.3d 63, 99 (2017) (citing 530 
U.S. 27 (2000)).  The Supreme Court in Hubbell held that, under the framework in 
Kastigar, the respondent’s motion to dismiss the indictment on immunity grounds 
must be granted unless the government proves the evidence used in obtaining the 
indictment and used in front of a grand jury or at trial was derived from legitimate 
and “wholly independent” sources.  Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 45.  
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The government developed methods and procedures to carry 
the Kastigar-imposed burden and minimize a potential “taint” from a 
compelled testimony.  For example, a prosecution can attempt to 
erect a “wall” around the immunized evidence, to shield the 
prosecutors from the contents of the testimony.236  Independently or 
simultaneously with the walls, the government creates “taint” or 
“filter” teams—consisting of agents and prosecutors not on a given 
case—to segregate materials that contain potential taint.237  Because 
of the rise of multi-national prosecutions and potential taint in foreign 
jurisdictions, as an alternative to a taint team, the DOJ has also 
embedded DOJ prosecutors into foreign law enforcement 
 
When a prohibited use of an immunized testimony occurs at trial or after trial, a 
court usually holds a Kastigar hearing to determine whether the prosecution can 
establish independent sources for its evidence.  See United States v. Slough, 677 F. 
Supp. 2d 112, 130 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“The Kastigar hearing may be held ‘pre-
trial, post-trial, mid-trial (as evidence is offered), or [through] some combination of 
these methods . . . .”) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. North, 910 
F.2d 843, 872-73 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).  Many courts however favor a pre-trial hearing 
because it gives defense broader pretrial discovery.  See United States v. Smith, 
580 F. Supp. 1418 (D.N.J. 1984); United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305 (8th 
Cir.1973); United States v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir.1985).  To be entitled to 
a hearing, the defendant must lay “a firm ‘foundation’ resting on more than 
‘suspicion’” that proffered evidence was tainted by exposure to immunized 
testimony.  United States v. North II, 920 F.2d 940, 949 n.9 (D.C. Cir.1990) 
(quoting Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 348–49 (1958)). 
236 See, e.g., United States v. Schwimmer, 882 F.2d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(suggesting the building of a “Chinese wall” to prevent taint in a subsequent trial).  
In recent years, critics increasingly view the term “Chinese Wall” as culturally 
insensitive. American Bar Association recommends using the term “screen” to 
denote the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter.  See MODEL 
CODE OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021). 
237 Filter and taint teams are also frequently used to find and insolate attorney-client 
privileged materials.  See Heidi Boghosian, Taint Teams and Firewalls: Thin 
Armor for Attorney-Client Privilege, 1 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL. & ETHICS J. 15, 21 
(2003).  But federal courts expressed skepticism of the Government’s use of taint 
teams to determine whether evidence is protected by the attorney-client privilege.  
See Eileen H. Rumfelt, “Taint Team” or Special Master: One Recent Analysis, AM. 
BAR ASS’N (Sept. 27, 2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/criminal/practice/2018/t
aint-team-or-special-master-one-recent-analysis/.  Additionally, the procedure has 
been criticized as “fox guarding the chicken coop” because of its frequent failures 
to safeguard the privilege.  Robert J. Anello & Richard F. Albert, Government 
Searches: The Trouble with Taint Teams, 256 N.Y. L.J. 108 (2016). 
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departments to promote coordination and avoid inadvertent exposure 
to tainted testimony.238 
The costs of the procedures that prevent potential taint 
increase exponentially with the complexity of the national and 
international investigations.239  At same time, questions arise about 
the efficiency of the ever-complex procedures to prevent taint.240  
The proponents of transactional immunity argue that taint teams and 
taint hearings simply do not grant protections coexistent with the self-
incrimination privilege because they allow prosecutors to rely on 
non-evidentiary uses of the compelled evidence.241  They reason that 
these precautions cannot prevent a prosecutor from “working 
backwards” from what he or she learns in the immunized testimony 
to establish an independent source for the prospective evidence242 or 
from “playing off” accomplices against each and using their 
respective testimonies as independent sources against each other.243 
Lastly, the proponents of transactional immunity also 
maintain that mere use-plus-fruits testimony cannot prevent 
prosecutors from subconsciously taking the immunized testimony 
into account in planning the pre-trial and trial strategy.244  On the 
other hand, the proponents of the use-plus-fruits immunity insist that 
the “heavy burden” a government must shoulder in a Kastigar 
hearing or a similar process is enough to safeguard against potential 
prosecutorial bad faith and “working backwards.”245  Equally, they 
 
238 Carlson, supra note 181, at 309. 
239 Determining compelled testimony taint in a case of a multi-jurisdictional 
investigation or a large corporation requires early and complete access to a large, 
often seemingly immeasurable, number and types of documents.  Such process 
requires large expenditures and significant cost-investment in the pre-trial stages.  
Id. at 316-17. 
240 See Amar & Lettow, supra note 24, at 878-79. 
241 See CRIMINAL PRACTICE MANUAL § 8.11(b) (4th ed. 2020). 
242 See State v. Soriano, 684 P.2d 1220, 1232 (1984), aff’d, 693 P.2d 26 (describing 
that “[i]t is unrealistic to give a dog a bone and to expect him not to chew on it.”) 
(quoting State ex rel. Johnson v. Woodrich, 566 P.2d 859, 861 (1977)); Wright v. 
McAdory, 536 So. 2d 897, 903 (Miss. 1988) (explaining it is “inevitable” that 
prosecutors under a use/derivative use immunity “will receive incentives to work 
backwards from what they learn from the witness.”).  See also CRIMINAL PRACTICE 
MANUAL § 8.11(b) (4th ed. 2020). 
243 See CRIMINAL PRACTICE MANUAL § 8.11(b) (4th ed. 2020). 
244 Kristine Strachan, Self-Incrimination, Immunity, and Watergate, 56 TEX. L. 
REV. 791, 807-08 (1978). 
245 See CRIMINAL PRACTICE MANUAL § 8.11(b) (4th ed. 2020). 
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believe that non-evidentiary use can be avoided by guidelines that 
ensure that the prosecutor is not familiar with the testimony246 and 
that prosecutors using immunized testimony against accomplices is 
no more than a hypothetical.247 
In sum, the taint procedures are expensive, and often 
inefficient.  And the complexity and costs of anti-taint procedures are 
only bound to grow as the examples of globalization of government 
prosecutions—such as in Allen—and the privatization of the 
government’s investigations—such as in Connolly—profligate, 
reflecting the trend of growing international crime of super-national 
corporations.  The applicability of the Fifth Amendment protections 
in these cases should not be questioned, nor restricted to certain types 
of evidentiary or non-evidentiary uses.  If the government decides to 
rely on a foreign government or a private corporation in furnishing 
evidence it tends to use in the U.S. prosecutions, it needs to be held to 
a higher standard than routinely required to prove that any evidence 
was indeed obtained from independent sources, and that the 
fundamental Fifth Amendment privileges were not outsourced with 
its investigative powers.  
IV. A CASE STUDY OF INCREASING GLOBALIZATION AND 
PRIVATIZATION IN THE U.S. PROSECUTIONS: THE GLOBAL 
LIBOR SCANDAL 
The LIBOR prosecutions showcase the challenges and 
possibilities of modern regulatory enforcement, and their impacts on 
the employee’s privilege against self-incrimination in the U.S. 
courts.248  They are an example of cross-national prosecutions of 
transnational financial crime and of a close-knit cooperation between 
the prosecuting authority and the banks involved therein.249  
The LIBOR scandal arose from the alleged rigging of the 
London Interbank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”).  LIBOR is an influential 




248 See infra Parts IV.A, B. 
249 See infra notes 268-71, 325-29 and accompanying text. 
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banks situated in London,250 calculated daily by the British Bankers’ 
Association (“BBA”) using estimates of the banks’ borrowing rates 
submitted by the banks.251  The BBA’s essentially unregulated rate-
setting252 came under scrutiny at the height of the financial crisis in 
2008 when the rumors of LIBOR’s inaccuracy erupted in a Wall 
Street Journal article that alleged that “[m]ajor banks [we]re 
contributing to the erratic behavior of a crucial global lending 
benchmark” by “reporting significantly lower borrowing costs for . . . 
LIBOR.”253  Soon the newspaper articles attracted public attention, 
which spurred the BBA to conduct its own investigation.254  Shortly 
thereafter, the authorities around the world started their investigations 
in the face of mounting public fears of what a loss of credibility in an 
important benchmark rate could do to the already faltering financial 
markets.255 
Because of the interconnectedness of the financial markets 
and global presence of the banks involved, LIBOR became the first 
truly global investigation: “[a]t least twenty-seven authorities from 
 
250 Milson C. Yu, LIBOR Integrity and Holistic Domestic Enforcement, 98 
CORNELL L. REV. 1271, 1272 (2013) (citing JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, 
AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 76 (8th ed. 2011)). 
251 For a detailed description and analysis of the methodology of LIBOR setting, 
see JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 76 (8th ed. 2011). 
252 See The Wheatley Review of LIBOR: Final Report, WHEATLEY REV. (Sept. 
2012), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
ment_data/file/191762/wheatley_review_LIBOR_finalreport_280912.pdf.  The 
Wheatley review was written by the newly appointed head of the UK’s Financial 
services Authority, Martin Wheatly in which he concluded that LIBOR regulation 
needed to be subjected to statutory regulation, not the BBA’s oversight, and 
suggested a host of reforms to verify and improve the reliability of submissions.  
Id. 
253 See Carrick Mollenkamp & Mark Whitehouse, Study Casts Doubt on Key Rate, 
WALL ST. J. (May 29, 2008, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121200703762027135.  
254 See David Enrich & Max Colchester, Before Scandal, Clash Over Control of 




255 See Mollenkamp, supra note 254.  An interest-rate strategist at Citigroup 
published a 2008 report on LIBOR in which he wrote about potential problems 
with LIBOR that “the long-term psychological and economic impacts this could 
have on the financial market are incalculable.”  Id. 
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twelve different jurisdictions” joined the investigative efforts.256  The 
sprawling investigation posed new challenges to international 
cooperation and law enforcement in their joint and parallel 
prosecutions of a wide range of misconducts birthed by the LIBOR 
scandal—ranging from antitrust violations to fraud.257 
The breadth of the investigation, the multitude of the actors 
involved, and the inevitably scattered evidence forced important 
probing of the rights and privileges of defendants involved in the 
LIBOR prosecutions.  With these investigative efforts came new 
questions about the scope of the privilege afforded to the defendants 
in these complex, global investigations.  There are two contexts that 
stood out in the LIBOR scandal.  The first one was when a foreign 
power compels a testimony.258  This occurred in Allen where the 
parallel British authority lawfully compelled testimony, and the U.S 
prosecuting authorities that had access to this testimony, 
simultaneously conducted their own investigation.  The second 
question is national in scope, but it concerns the close cooperation 
between the banks and the government.  The decision in Connolly 
highlighted the closeness of cooperation between the prosecuting 
authorities and private banks.259  In such joint ventures, the 
government may outsource its investigative powers to private 
counsel.  Any evidence obtained by the private counsel is therefore 
 
256 Pieter J.F. Huizing, Parallel Enforcement of Rate Rigging: Lessons To Be 
Learned From LIBOR, J. ANTITRUST ENF’T, Nov. 2014, at 1-2 n.1 (“The European 
Commission, the US Department of Justice (DOJ), the US Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the US 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the US Federal Reserve, the 
Canadian Competition Bureau, the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) (now 
the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulation Authority 
(PRA), the UK Office of Fair Trading (OFT), the UK Competition Commission, 
the UK Bank of England, the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO), the Swiss Financial 
Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA), the Swiss Competition Commission 
(COMCO), the German BaFin, the German Bundesbank, the Netherlands Authority 
for the Financial Markets, the Dutch central bank, the Dutch Fiscal Intelligence and 
Investigation Service, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, the 
Japan Financial Services Agency (JFSA), Japan Securities and Exchange 
Surveillance Commission, the Monetary Authority of Singapore, the Securities and 
Futures Commission of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, the 
Chinese National Development and Reform Commission and the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission.”).  
257 Id. at 2. 
258 See infra Part IV.A. 
259 See infra notes 325-29 and accompanying text.  
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subject to Fifth Amendment constraints.260  Such threats may amount 
to compulsion and warrant Fifth Amendment protection. 
A. United States v. Allen 
The co-defendants in Allen—Anthony Allen and Anthony 
Conti—were British traders from the Rabobank’s London office 
prosecuted in the Southern District of New York.  The U.S. case 
against them, however, arose out of a United Kingdom conduct and a 
subsequent investigation by the Financial Conduct Authority 
(“FCA”).261  Allen and Conti were responsible for Rabobank’s U.S. 
dollar LIBOR submissions and tried in the U.S. for crimes arising 
from the manipulation of the LIBOR benchmark rate that impacted 
the U.S. markets: wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud 
and bank fraud.262 
Prior to their New York trial, the FCA, a British equivalent of 
the DOJ, carried out a series of compelled interviews of Allen and 
Conti pursuant to their statutory authority.263  Unlike in the United 
States, where a compelled interview would be immunized from direct 
prosecution as well as prosecution based on the fruits of this 
testimony, the United Kingdom only immunized Allen and Conti 
from direct prosecution based on their interviews, not prosecution 
based on evidence derived thereof.264 
The distinction became crucial during the testimony of Paul 
Robson, a former Rabobank colleague of Allen and Conti and 
Japanese Yen submitter.  Robson, who pleaded guilty,265 became a 
crucial cooperating witness for the Unites States’ case against Allen 
and Conti.266  Prior to the DOJ action, Robson also had been 
investigated by the FCA—an action that was dropped for unknown 
 
260 See infra note 334 and accompanying text. 
261 United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 68 (2d Cir. 2017). 
262 Id. at 68 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1349). 
263 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, c. 8 § 171 (U.K.) (granting the U.K.’s 
Financial Conduct’s Authority the power to compel testimony). 
264 Allen, 864 F.3d at 76. 
265 Id. at 77. 
266 See id.  Robson was an important cooperator assisting the DOJ with developing 
the case.  Id. at 68.  For his cooperation, Robson was rewarded with a lenient 
sentence with no jail time—only two years of supervised release by U.S. District 
Judge Jed Rakoff.  Nate Raymond, Ex-Rabobank trader turned U.S. cooperating 
witness spared prison, REUTERS (Nov. 14, 2016, 3:00 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-rabobank-na-libor-idUSKBN1392CO. 
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reasons—267 where he had learned of relevant testimonial evidence in 
the case against him that Allen’s and Conti’s statements were 
compelled by the United Kingdom.268  Allen’s and Conti’s 
indictments were based solely on the materials that Robson supplied 
to the grand jury.269  Robson’s testimony in the U.S. trial was crucial 
for the conviction of Allen and Conti.  Aware of the U.S.’s reliance 
on evidence provided by Robson, Allen’s and Conti’s lawyers moved 
under Kastigar to dismiss the indictments or to suppress Robson’s 
testimony.270  Judge Rakoff, however, decided to proceed with a trial 
and address the issues in a post-trial Kastigar hearing.271 
The post-trial Kastigar hearing revealed that Robson 
extensively reviewed and annotated the compelled testimonies not 
only before the trial but also prior to giving a statement to the FBI.272  
When testifying at Allen’s and Conti’s trial, the FBI agent then relied 
on Robson’s statements made after reading the compelled 
testimony.273  Still, it was not clear how.  The Second Circuit 
precedent was not settled on the question whether Fifth Amendment 
protections apply to testimonies compelled by a foreign sovereign. 
To be clear, the DOJ took certain precautions against 
exposure to the testimony, predicting possible constitutional 
challenges against its cooperation with the FCA and knowledge of 
the existence of the compelled statements.  According to what 
became more-or-less a standard operating procedure under 
circumstances that deal with coerced evidence,274 the DOJ held 
meetings with the FCA about the need to establish a wall between the 
 
267 Allen, 864 F.3d at 68. 
268 Id. at 77. 
269 Id. at 68. 
270 Id. at 78. 
271 A court can hold a Kastigar hearing pre-, post-, or mid-trial to determine 
whether a prohibited use of an immunized testimony occurred and whether the 
government can establish an independent source for the evidence introduced at 
trial.  See generally supra text accompanying note 236. 
272 Allen, 864 F.3d at 78. 
273 Id.  Citing the Kastigar Hearing Transcript, the Second Circuit wrote that Agent 
Weeks’ testimony in front of the Grand Jury relied in certain part exclusively on 
Robson’s testimony, including allegations that Allen “instructed, specifically 
instructed, LIBOR submitters in London to consider the positions and the requests 
of Rabobank traders and adjust their submissions for LIBOR and various currencies 
based on the means of those traders.”  Id.  
274 See supra notes 237-48 and accompanying text on the prosecutorial use of 
walls, prevention of taint, and their relative ineffectiveness. 
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two agencies to prevent any taint in the DOJ’s case.275  The series of 
meetings hashed out the specific procedures applied in the FCA’s and 
the DOJ’s parallel LIBOR investigations.276  Moreover, the DOJ 
created a Filter Team— a team of attorneys from a different section 
of the Department who worked on warding off potential taint arising 
from the compelled testimonies.277 
Judge Rakoff of the Southern District of New York issued a 
decision on the defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment or to 
suppress Robson’s testimony without deciding the Fifth 
Amendment’s applicability to statements compelled by a foreign 
power.278  And even if Kastigar protections applied to testimony 
compelled by a foreign power,279 Judge Rakoff found that the 
government had met its burden of proof to show that the evidence it 
used was derived from wholly independent sources.280  The district 
court determined the scope of required Kastigar protections based on 
the Second Circuit precedent in United States v. Nanni.281  
Specifically, the court held that the DOJ proved its burden by 
establishing a “strict and effective wall of separation”282 and showing 
an independent source “to wit, [Robson’s] personal experience and 
observations,”283 leading to the dismissal of the defendant’s motion 
and their conviction. 
The Second Circuit reversed Allen’s and Conti’s conviction 
on the very Kastigar grounds that the Southern District rejected.  
 
275 United States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684, 694-95 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
276 Allen, 864 F.3d at 76 (“[T]he FCA agreed to procedures to maintain a ‘wall’ 
between its investigation and the DOJ’s investigation, including a ‘day one/day 
two’ interview procedure in which the DOJ interviewed witnesses prior to the 
FCA.”). 
277 Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Based on 
Kastigar at 2 n.1, United States v. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) 
(No.14-cr-00272-JSR). 
278 See Allen, 160 F. Supp 3d at 690 n.8 (stating in a footnote that there was no need 
to determine if Kastigar applied to a testimony compelled by a foreign sovereign, 
because even in the event it did apply, “the Government has met its Kastigar 
burden on the facts here determined”). 
279 Id. (stating that although the question of applicability is “deeply interesting,” the 
court has no occasion to resolve it here). 
280 Id. 
281 See 59 F.3d 1425, 1431-32 (2d Cir.1995) (requiring that the government must 
make a showing by a preponderance of evidence that the evidence presented at trial 
was derived from wholly independent sources).  
282 Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d at 695. 
283 Id. at 697. 
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Judge Cabranes, writing for the majority, discussed in detail not only 
the alleged Kastigar violation, but also the applicability of the Fifth 
Amendment to evidence compelled by a foreign sovereign.  The 
court in Allen stated that the imposition of a requirement that 
confessions obtained by foreign law enforcements are voluntary has a 
significant constitutional footing.284  Relying on Bram v. United 
States,285 the court held that in a criminal trial in the United States, 
“wherever a question arises whether a confession is incompetent 
because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by [that] portion of the 
fifth amendment . . . commanding that no person ‘shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.’”286 
The Court further devoted significant detail to distinguishing 
the protections guaranteed by the Self-Incrimination clause from 
exclusionary rules attached to unreasonable searches and seizures of 
the Fourth Amendment.287  Even though courts have sometimes 
likened certain features of the Fifth Amendment jurisprudence to the 
Fourth Amendment one, the court pointed that the Fourth 
Amendment “prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures whether 
or not the evidence is sought to be used in a criminal trial.”288  
Quoting the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit pointed out that “the 
Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy 
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its 
deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party 
aggrieved.”289  Because the exclusionary rules are “designed to 
prevent United States police officers from relying upon improper 
interrogation techniques,”290 such exclusionary rules, according to the 
court, “have little, if any, deterrent effect upon foreign police 
officers.”291  The court then concluded that because the structures of 
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are so different, the court did not 
apply the Fourth Amendment, inclusive of Miranda jurisprudence, to 
foreign authorities.292 
 
284 United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2017). 
285 168 U.S. 532 (1897). 
286 Allen, 864 F.3d at 101 n. 70 (quoting Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 
(1897)).  
287 Id. at 81-83.  
288 Id. at 82.  
289 Id. (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)). 
290 Id. (quoting United States v. Welch, 455 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1972)). 
291 Id. 
292 Id.  
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The Second Circuit held that because a violation of the 
constitutional right against Self-Incrimination only occurs at a 
criminal trial, even if a conduct that may impair this right occurs 
before the trial, “it naturally follows that, regardless of the origin—
whether domestic or foreign—of a statement, it cannot be admitted at 
trial in the United States if the statement was ‘compelled.’”293  
Because the privilege against self-incrimination is derived from the 
Constitution and is not an exclusionary remedy, its protections apply 
in the American courtrooms regardless whether the statement was 
compelled by a foreign power and whether it was done lawfully.  
Accordingly, the Fifth Amendment’s constitutional prerogative is 
clear and far-reaching—“compelled testimony cannot be used to 
secure a conviction in an American court.”294 
On appeal, the U.S. government introduced a “parade of 
horribles” that it claimed would ensue if the Fifth Amendment 
applied to testimony compelled by foreign sovereigns.  The 
government argued that a foreign government could obstruct U.S. 
prosecutions by inadvertently divulging a compelled testimony to a 
witness or to the public.295  Worse yet, the government worried, a 
hostile government could frustrate the U.S. prosecutions by a simple 
act of compelling a defendant and publicizing the testimony.296 
The Second Circuit dismissed the government’s concern of 
potential obstruction by foreign sovereigns.  The court showed that 
the government’s argument was deficient because it failed to account 
for the very same danger of obstruction that already exists within the 
federal system composed of “State and National Governments.”297  
The court saw no difference between the dangers and benefits that 
come with state and federal prosecutions within the U.S. vis-à-vis 
parallel prosecutions conducted in private companies and in nation 
states.298  Furthermore, the court explained that since the legitimacy 
of the United Kingdom’s procedures are not in question in Allen, the 
holding in this case shall not foreclose possible prosecutions in 
instances where a foreign government indeed attempts to sabotage a 
 
293 Id. at 82 (quoting In re Terrorist Bombing of U.S. Embassies in E. Africa, 552 
F.3d 177, 199 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
294 Id. at 82. 
295 Id. at 87. 
296 Id. at 88. 
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U.S. prosecution.299 
The court remarked that even the government observed the 
existence of a need for closer cooperation between sovereign 
governments because of the perils of the Fifth Amendment.300  
Furthermore, the government was acutely aware that the FCA 
transmitted the compelled testimony to their key witness—Robson—
and thus the risk of such coordination should be borne by the United 
States’ government, should it decide to pursue the case.301   
Lastly, the court in Allen remarked on trends in federal 
prosecutions—that cross-border prosecutions such as the one in this 
case became more common, making the self-incrimination concerns 
more urgent.302  The court noted that cooperation between sovereigns 
became not only more frequent, but perhaps already ingrained within 
the institutions.  For example, U.S. prosecutors are embedded in 
foreign law enforcement such as with Eurojust in The Hague and the 
International Criminal Police Organization in France, with a vision 
also to expand to foreign law enforcement.303  Because of this new 
and expansive enforcement cooperation, the court foreshadowed that 
securing witness testimony will be a crucial part of this “brave new 
world of international criminal enforcement” because of the conduct, 
such as the one in the LIBOR case, that often sprawls continents.304  
However, the Second Circuit affirmed that this expansion shall not 
affect the “fairness of our trials at home.”305  In the court’s words, 
marshalling foreign subjects to the U.S. courts “to fend for their 
liberty” should not be done without affording these men and women 
trial rights that the United States regard as “fundamental”306 and 
“absolute.”307 
Allen signals the courts’ recognition of the changing 
 
299 Id. at 88. 
300 Id. at 90. 
301 Id. at 87-88. 
302 Id. at 89.  
303 Id. at 89 (introducing as an example the DOJ plan to embed anti-corruption 
prosecutors with the FCA in the UK, making it the first time in the history of the 
DOJ Criminal Division for a prosecutor to work in a foreign regulatory agency). 
304 Id. at 90. 
305 Id. (quoting United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 700 (1998)). 
306 Id. (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.259, 264 (1990) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
307 Id. (quoting Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178, 184 (2013) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
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prosecutorial landscape.308  The decision surely brings a hurdle to the 
international cooperation because the U.S. authorities now know that 
Fifth Amendment protections apply abroad.309  Given, however, the 
extent of existing foreign cooperation and the various Filter Teams 
and taint-protections that the government used prior to Allen,310 this 
decision will hardly add to the burden that the government already 
shoulders. 
The government expressed concerns that it cannot get 
involved at the very early stages of every investigation in every 
country that may afford lesser protections than guaranteed by the 
Fifth Amendment,311 as required by the Second Circuit.312  But this 
concern again ignores the extent to which there already exists a close-
knit coordination between the U.S. and other prosecuting 
authorities.313 
It also simplifies the realities of international coordination.  
Foreign conduct so large that it impacts the U.S. market is unlikely to 
escape public attention once a foreign power commences 
prosecution.  In addition to communication through official 
diplomatic channels, the magnitude and publicity surrounding events 
impacting global markets, such as the LIBOR scandal, make it 
unlikely that the United States government would not notice when a 
foreign prosecution commences. 
Furthermore, as in federal and state prosecutions, the 
government in a foreign prosecution also has an opportunity to 
evaluate the merits of the case before it decides to engage, whether to 
seek out evidence and witnesses from a parallel investigating entity, 
or whether to commence an investigation at all.314  The U.S. 
 
308 See supra notes 297-301 and accompanying text. 
309 See infra note 311. 
310 See supra Part III.C. 
311 Petition of the United States for Rehearing or Rehearing en Banc at 15, United 
States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 16-898), reh’g denied, (Nov. 9, 
2017), ECF No. 136. 
312 Allen, 864 F.3d at 89 (stating that “intimate cooperation and coordination will be 
needed between U.S. prosecutors and foreign authorities (or, perhaps the U.S. 
prosecutors and U.S. prosecutors on detail to foreign authorities)” to secure witness 
testimony). 
313 See supra Parts II.D, IV.B; see also supra notes 188-94. 
314 See generally Lisa L. Miller & James Eisenstein, Federal/State Criminal 
Prosecution Nexus: A Case Study in Cooperation and Discretion, L. & SOC. 
INQUIRY 239, 241-44 (describing the evolution and trends in federal and state 
prosecution and cooperation and federal prosecutorial discretion). 
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government is sophisticated enough to know which cooperating 
countries and authorities have procedures inconsistent with rights that 
need be afforded in the U.S. trials.315  The government can plan 
ahead how to cooperate and properly secure an investigation from 
such taint. 
The Second Circuit in Allen, however, did not decide the 
scope of the taint created by a testimony compelled abroad.  The 
court addressed instances when a witness’s taint formed the basis of 
an indictment, but the court did not rule on the extent of the 
protections if the taint was less direct, or perhaps non-evidentiary in 
nature, such as occasions where the taint shapes the trial strategy or 
cross-examination.  An earlier review of the law in different circuits 
suggests that there is confusion surrounding the exact difference 
between indirect evidentiary taint and non-evidentiary taint.316  But, 
given the “fundamental” and “absolute” regard for the fundamental 
trial right embodied in the Fifth Amendment,317 the courts should not 
be drawing a hard-and-fast line between evidentiary and non-
evidentiary uses. 
It is the effect of the use, not the category of the information, 
which should determine whether the defendant is placed in the same 
position as if she chose not to testify.  Therefore, agencies engaging 
in foreign prosecutions should, as advised by the Second Circuit in 
Allen, carefully examine potential compelled testimony at the very 
outset of an investigation and adopt necessary precautions to 
minimize, if not eradicate, the potential of any exposure — direct or 
indirect. 
 
315 For example, in Canada, a witness cannot refuse to answer a question on the 
ground of self-incrimination.  The witness receives “a full evidentiary immunity in 
return,” but is not guaranteed that this testimony will not be handed over to the 
prosecuting authorities in the United States.  In the United Kingdom, the chief 
financial regulator can compel a witness’s testimony.  And in Australia, a witness 
receives only use immunity when the prosecuting agency compels her to testify.  
See Neal Modi, Toward an International Right Against Self-Incrimination: 
Expanding the Fifth Amendment’s “Compelled” to Foreign Compulsion, 103 VA. 
L.R. 961, 965-66 (2017). 
316 See supra Part II.D. 
317 See supra text accompanying note 249; see also supra Part II.A.  
57
Resar Krasulova: Globalization and Privatization
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center,
1314 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 37 
B.  United States v. Connolly 
The 2019 Connolly decision from the Southern District of 
New York resembles the Second Circuit’s decision in Allen.  The 
Connolly case involved foreign subjects implicated in the LIBOR 
scandal — a U.K. citizen, Gavin Campbell Black, and a U.S. citizen, 
Matthew Connolly, working for Deutsche Bank’s London and New 
York offices, respectively.  Similar to the defendants in Allen, 
Connolly and Black were indicted in the Southern District in 2016 for 
conspiracy to commit wire fraud, bank fraud, and substantive counts 
of fraud alleging a scheme to manipulate the LIBOR interest rate for 
personal gains.318 
The United States’ investigation into Deutsche Bank and 
LIBOR submitters’ Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(“CFTC”), which commenced at the height of the LIBOR scandal, 
long preceded Black’s and Connolly’s eventual indictment.319  On 
April 19, 2010, the CFTC sent a letter to Deutsche Bank’s General 
Counsel, Joseph Polizzotto, advising Deutsche Bank that it 
“‘expect[ed]’ the Bank to ‘cooperate fully’ with its investigation.”320  
Attached to the letter to Mr. Polizzoto, and consistent with the 
government’s strong incentivizing of cooperation,321 was a CFTC 
Enforcement Advisory Memorandum.322  The Memorandum advised 
that a corporation may receive a cooperation credit if it makes 
“employee or other relevant corporate documents available in a 
timely manner.”323 
The Deutsche Bank’s counsel complied with the demands.324 
Looking back at this cooperation, the counsel for Paul Weiss testified 
at Black’s and Connolly’s trials that there was nothing “voluntary” 
about the investigation that followed the receipt of the government’s 
letter.325  To avoid penalties, and possible irreversible damage from 
an indictment, Deutsche Bank broadened the scope of Paul Weiss’s 
 
318 No. 16 Cr. 0370, 2019 WL 2120523, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2019). 
319 Id. at *1-2. 
320 Id. at *2. 
321 See supra notes 188-94 for an overview of the federal government’s settlement 
policy. 
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representation to include investigating allegations in connection to 
LIBOR which “was demanded (not requested) by the CFTC.”326 
The cooperation between Deutsche Bank’s counsel and the 
government agencies—including the CFTC, the SEC, and eventually 
the DOJ—was so extensive327 that it raised questions as to what 
extent, if at all, did the government conduct its investigatory job of 
Deutsche Bank at the outset of the investigation.328  The federal 
agencies were present and coordinating the investigation with Paul 
Weiss from the very beginning, and they remained involved 
throughout the years of internal investigation.329  During this time, 
the government was “kept abreast of developments on a regular 
basis,” and “gave considerable direction to the investigating Paul 
Weiss attorneys, both about what to do and how to do it.”330 
During the course of the investigation, and in addition to 
numerous document and interview requests, the CFTC “asked” Paul 
Weiss to identify and host additional in-person interviews with three 
Deutsche Bank employees, including Black, as well as anyone these 
three employees interacted with.331  Paul Weiss interviewed Black 
again in 2011, 2012, and 2014.332  At the fourth interview in 2014, 
Deutsche Bank went as far as “ask[ing] the Government for 
‘permission’ to interview its own employee.”333  Over the years, 
Black could not refuse to talk to Deutsche Bank’s investigative team 
 
326 Id. 
327 The 2015 Paul Weiss “White Paper” summarizes, in broad terms, the extent of 
Deutsche Bank’s cooperation. 
During the course of Deutsche Bank’s nearly five-year internal 
investigation, Paul Weiss lawyers conducted nearly 200 interviews of 
more than fifty Bank employees-including, of course, of Black-and 
shared the results of these interviews with the Government. In addition 
to conducting interviews, Paul Weiss extracted and reviewed 158 million 
electronic documents, as well as listened to 850,00 audio files, or over 
hundreds of thousands of hours of audio tapes.  
Id. at *7 (internal citations omitted). 
328 Id. at *12 (“In other words, Paul Weiss did everything that the Government 
could, should, and would have done had the Government been doing its own work.  
The fact that the record contains very little evidence about the Government’s own 
independent investigative efforts during the first three years of Deutsche Bank’s 
“voluntary” investigation renders that inference all the more compelling. . . .”). 
329 Id. at *2. 
330 Id. 
331 Id. at *3. 
332 Id. at *4-6. 
333 Id. at *6. 
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if he wished to retain his job.334  Because of this extensive 
cooperation between the government and Deutsche Bank’s counsel, 
the court found that the government had outsourced its investigative 
powers, requiring the application of the Garrity standard to private 
conduct.335 
Despite attributing the government’s action to Paul Weiss’s 
compelled interviews on behalf of Deutsche Bank, the district court 
held that the government’s use of Black’s compelled interview did 
not constitute a Kastigar violation.336  The court added that even if 
there was a Kastigar violation, it was harmless error.337  This is 
because it is an established principle that “‘Garrity immunity 
automatically attache[s]’ where an employer makes a sufficiently 
clear and direct threat that it will take an adverse employment action 
against a public employee.”338  In other words, even though the 
immunity attached to Black’s compelled interviews with Paul Weiss, 
the court found that the Government’s use of the compelled 
interviews did not violate Black’s Kastigar rights. 
By way of example, the court listed certain direct and indirect 
uses that are against Kastigar’s mandate, such as “obtaining [an] 
indictment based on tainted evidence,”339 “preparing [the 
Government’s case for trial,”340 or “presenting tainted evidence to the 
 
334 Deutsche Banks’s employee policy provided that an “employee ‘must fully 
cooperate with Compliance and other appropriate Deutsche Bank departments (e.g., 
legal, Group Audit, etc.) handling internal and external examinations, 
investigations and other reviews involving Deutsche Bank, its customers and other 
related company activities.’”  Id. at *3 (internal citation omitted).  The policy did 
not provide for express termination in the case of non-cooperation, but such a threat 
was within the contemplated sanctions.  Id. (“Employees who violate Deutsche 
Bank’s policies may be subject to disciplinary action up to and including 
termination of employment.”). 
335 Id. at *10.  The Garrity rule applies where “‘there is a sufficiently close nexus 
between the state and the challenged action.’”  Id.  Judge McMahon found that the 
record established this nexus, because “Deutsche Bank’s interviews of Gavin 
Black, or which he was compelled to sit under threat of termination, are fairly 
attributable to the Government.”  Id. at *14.  See also supra Part III.B (regarding 
the mechanism of attributing private action to the government). 
336 Id. at *1. 
337 Id. at *22. 
338 Id. at *16 (quoting United States v. Palmquist, 712 F.3d 640, 646 (1st Cir. 
2013)).  
339 Id. at *21 (quoting United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 45 (2000)). 
340 Id. (quoting United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 45 (2000)). 
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grand jury.”341  Yet, the court concluded that, despite government 
outsourcing, the defendants failed to lay a sufficiently “firm 
foundation” to support their theory of a Kastigar violation342 and the 
Government successfully carried its burden to show that its evidence 
was derived from independent sources.343 
Similar to the district court in Allen,344 the court in Connolly 
relied on the Second Circuit’s decisions in Riveccio and Nanni in 
determining that the degree of prohibited use of Black’s testimony 
was “merely tangential”345 and as such did not “influence[] the 
[G]overnment’s decision to pursue its line of investigation.”346  This  
conclusion rested on the court’s finding that: no direct evidence of 
Black’s testimony was admitted as evidence in the trial, the 
government did not use Black’s false exculpatory indirectly, and 
none of the 3,500 material witnesses the government called contained 
information that would suggest that the government discussed 
Black’s testimony with them.347  The court rejected Black’s counsel’s  
theory of taint that the government relied on Black’s initial 
interview’s with Deutsche Bank’s counsel “to gain an understanding 
of the LIBOR process, identify evidence, and develop investigative 
leads” as non-evidentiary, and not protected under the Fifth 
Amendment.348 
However, the court agreed that the inquiry under Kastigar 
immunity is not based on the categorical content of the testimony, but 
rather on “the ways in which they influenced the Government’s 
case.”349  Listing the impermissible uses of immunized testimony, the 
court included an example of false denials that could be “‘‘used’ 
against [defendants] in the sense that’ such denials might ‘provide[] 
the motivation for’ cooperating witness to testify.”350  An additional 
impermissible use of an immunized testimony may be to “tip off a 
 
341 Id. (quoting United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 377 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). 
342 Id. at *12.  The court did not specify what would constitute a sufficient 
foundation that would entitle the defendant to a Kastigar hearing. 
343 Id. at *22-23. 
344 See supra note 225 and accompanying text. 
345 Connolly, 2019 WL 2120523, at *2. 
346 Id. at *21 (quoting United States v. Riveccio, 919 F.2d 812, 815 & n.3 (2d. Cir. 
1990)).  
347 Id. (quoting United States v. Nanni, 59 F.3d 1432, 1432 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
348 Id. at *19. 
349 Id. at *18 (citing United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). 
350 Id. (quoting Uniting States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 689 (2d Cir. 1990)).  
61
Resar Krasulova: Globalization and Privatization
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center,
1318 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 37 
grand jury that a defendant’s testimony is not credible.”351  The 
court’s examples show the thin line drawn between evidentiary and 
non-evidentiary uses.  For example, the use of compelled testimony 
to motivate co-conspirators would be, at least in some circumstances, 
considered a non-evidentiary use.352  This, in turn, has been rejected 
by many courts as prohibited use per se under Kastigar.353 
The court’s analysis of what constitutes impermissible use 
underscores an important point about the scope of the self-
incrimination privilege as interpreted in the light of its historical 
importance recognized in Garrity, Kastigar, Hubbell, and Allen.  The 
use of categorical nomenclature, such as evidentiary and non-
evidentiary, restricts the breadth of the inquiry under the Fifth 
Amendment that is necessary to preserve its protections. 
An inquiry under the Fifth Amendment consistent with the 
courts’ expansive reading of it should turn on whether the evidence is 
“testimonial” in character354 and whether the use of the immunity has 
“le[ft] the witness and the Federal Government in substantially the 
same position as if the witness had claimed his privilege in the 
absence of a grant of immunity.”355  Preserving this inquiry is 
especially important as the breadth and the methods of government 
prosecutions evolve nationally and globally.  Categorizing 
information based on evidentiary and non-evidentiary uses cannot 
capture the multitude of ways a government can be exposed to 
compelled evidence – whether it is from private firms or other 
governments – nor can it keep up with the rapid evolution of the 
investigative and enforcement methods. 
The court’s holding in Connolly also signaled an important 
change in ways how courts may view large corporate internal 
investigations conducted by a private counsel at the government’s 
 
351 Id. (citing United States v. Cortese, 568 F. Supp. 119, 131-32 (M.D. Pa. 1983)). 
352 See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
353 See supra Part II.D. 
354 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 35 (2000). 
355 Id. at 40 (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 458-59 (1972)). 
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behest.356  The eagerness of the firms to cooperate with the 
government and furnish the most, and the best, information regarding 
potential wrongdoings was as much a survival strategy on the part of 
the banks which desired a favorable strategy as it was the 
Government’s strategy to outsource large parts of complex 
investigations and gain vital information needed to increase the 
number of individual corporate convictions.357  But the strategy 
seems to have led to plea deals with potentially guilty actors to secure 
convictions of the middle-rank employees,358 and it also eroded the 
Fifth Amendment constitutional protections of those thrown in the 
crosshairs. 
Yet, in the aftermath of Allen and Black, the government may 
have to be more cautious in the way it conducts its investigations.  
Connolly signals that the courts may begin to more closely scrutinize 
the government’s communications and any cooperation with, or 
instanced outsourcing investigations to, private actors.359  Because 
the outer bounds of what constitutes a prohibited use of compelled 
testimony under Kastigar are undefined by the courts, and many uses 
do not even squarely fit with the current framework operating within 
the evidentiary and non-evidentiary categories, courts could – and 
should – subject every use to an effect inquiry, asking to what extent 
did the use change the defendant’s situation.  The government and 
private counsels will therefore have to closely monitor the extent of 
their cooperation and implement new safeguards in interviews 
conducted at the government’s request in order to ensure the 
preservation of employees’ privilege against self-incrimination. 
 
356 See Connolly, 2019 WL 2120523, at *1 (citing Abbe David Lowell & 
Christopher D. Man, Federalizing Corporate Internal Investigations and the 
Erosion of Employees’ Fifth Amendment Rights, 40 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. 
PROC. iii (2011)).  Judge McMahon acknowledged that there are “profound 
implications if the Government . . . is routinely outsourcing its investigations into 
complex financial matters to the targets of those investigations, who are in a 
uniquely coercive position vis-à-vis potential targets of criminal activity.”  Id. 
357 See supra Part III.A on the privatization of government investigations. 
358 See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text. 
359 See S.D.N.Y. Decision May Have Outsized Implications on DOJ’s 
“Outsourcing” of Investigations, QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP. 
(May 8, 2019), https://www.quinnemanuel.com/media/1419441/sdny-decision-
may-have-outsized-implications-on-doj-s-outsourcing-of-investigations.pdf. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The global reach of international business facilitated the 
growth and impact of both international financial crime and 
international prosecutions.360  Corporate eagerness to settle 
misconduct tightened cooperation between the government and 
corporate entities.361  The government’s need to identify individual 
culprits of large misconduct, and corporate eagerness to avoid 
ruinous consequences of a potential dragged-out trial, grew into a 
mode of cooperation where the government conditioned favorable 
settlements on corporate willingness to cooperate on government’s 
terms.  Globally, the government also began to rely on information 
supplied by foreign sovereigns to conduct its own investigations.362  
Connolly and Allen are examples of the prosecution trends in cases 
that become globalized, privatized, and more complex. 
The globalization and privatization of the government’s 
investigations endanger the protections granted by the Fifth 
Amendment in the United States.  The government’s actions become 
obscured by the complexity of the crime, numerosity of the actors 
cooperating with (or acting on behalf of) the government, and 
uncertainties about the scope of the self-incrimination privilege.  
Thus, the government can hide its conduct behind actions of a 
corporation or a sovereign.  As a second line of defense, it can also, 
after receiving volumes of information from a different government 
or a corporation, argue that its use of a testimony was “non-
evidentiary.”  Such prosecutions go against the historical importance 
of the Fifth Amendment as well as against precedent that placed great 
value on the Fifth Amendment’s ability to protect individuals from 
overzealous government actions.  Thus, the rights of an individual 
become weakened by getting caught in the midst of much larger, and 
better-informed, governments and multi-national corporations each 
pursuing its own goals. 
The law should not get blind-sided by these developments, 
and adequate protections should be required from the government 
when it cooperates with foreign governments or outsources any of its 
investigative functions into private hands.  At the same time, to 
counteract this change, the courts need to scrutinize this “brave new 
 
360 See supra Part III. 
361 See supra Part IV.C. 
362 See supra Part IV.A. 
64
Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 3 [], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss3/7
2021 GLOBALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION 1321 
world”363 of prosecution with more flexible standards of review.  
Kastigar did not set the exact boundaries for what is an 
impermissible testimonial use.  Rather, the standard is flexible, 
allowing for readjustment and re-alignment in the face of developing 
prosecution trends.  Courts should therefore rid themselves of the 
imprecise and obscure terminology that connects constitutionality 
with evidentiary and non-evidentiary terminology; instead, they 
should use an open-ended inquiry that will allow for evaluating each 
use of a compelled testimony on a case-by-case basis. 
 
 
363 United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 90 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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